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Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can
Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent
Wrongful Convictions?
Lisa Dufraimont*
Recent years have seen increasing concern over the prevalence of wrongful convictions in
Canadian criminal courts. This concern is particularly pronounced in jury trials, as jurors are
untrained and often lack the familiarity, experience and knowledge required to evaluate
evidence of doubtful reliability. Research has suggested that three forms of evidence -
eyewitness identification, confessions and jailhouse-informant testimony -pose particular
reliability concerns in jury trials. The special problem, common to all three, is the tendency of
jurors to overlook the factors that make them unreliable. Canadian criminal evidence law
purports to address this problem, but the author argues that the law has hardened into a rigid
set of category-based rules that are not particularly conducive to protecting the innocent. Rules
that exclude unreliable evidence, as well as rules providing for cautionary instructions or
expert testimony on its frailties, all have a place in controlling the risk of wrongful
convictions. The author argues that these options should not be treated as strict alternatives.
This paper begins with a discussion of the existing approach to eyewitness identification,
confessions and jailhouse-informant testimony. It then offers a discussion of the two basic
choices that underlie these rules, with each choice involving difficult trade-offs. The "method"
choice asks whether educating a jury about the dangers of these types of unreliable prosecution
evidence is preferred over limiting a jury's adjudicative freedom. The "knowledge" choice asks
whether courts should allow experts to speak to the jury's misguided beliefs, or whether judges
should use their own experiences in instructing and cautioning juries. The author is critical of
evidentiary rules that are too rigid, and she suggests a flexible regulatory scheme for dealing
with these unreliable forms of evidence. She argues that a blend of educating and limiting
strategies, and of expert and judicial knowledge, will bring an effective balance that protects
" Assistant Professor, Queen's University, Faculty of Law. This article is drawn from
my doctoral dissertation, The Problem of Jury Error in Canadian Criminal Evidence Law,
which was completed in December 2006 in fulfillment of the requirements for the J.S.D.
degree from Yale University. I am grateful for the support of Yale Law School and of the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which funded the research
with a Doctoral Fellowship. I would also like to thank my doctoral supervisor, Steven
Duke, and others who read and commented on this work, including Mirjan Damaska,
Abraham Goldstein, Kate Stith and Don Stuart.
L. Dufraimont
the innocent without unduly hindering prosecutors. The author ultimately proposes three
approaches that should ground a spectrum of safeguards against the problem of evidentiary
unreliability: judicial exclusion of unreliable evidence, jury education about the frailties of
evidence associated with wrongful convictions, and the use of expert evidence when judicial
instruction would be inadequate.
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Introduction
Recent years have seen an upsurge of concern about wrongful
convictions. Beginning in the 1980s, accelerating through the 1990s, and
continuing to the present, a wave of exonerations of the wrongly
convicted has shaken public confidence in criminal justice systems
throughout the common law world.' Fuelling this wave has been the
availability since 1989 of forensic DNA testing, which has established
the innocence of more than 200 convicted persons in the United States
alone.' Scholars and policymakers have probed the causes of these
errors,3 while commissions of inquiry have been struck to re-evaluate
criminal justice processes and to find out what went wrong in particular
1. In Canada, those exonerated after serving years in prison include Donald Marshall,
Jr., David Milgaard, Guy Paul Morin and Thomas Sophonow. In the United Kingdom,
the most infamous wrongful convictions are those of the Guilford Four and the
Birmingham Six, who were exonerated in 1989 and 1991 after being convicted in terrorist
bombings that took place in the mid-1970s.
2. The Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School maintains a list - now more than 200
strong - of individuals exonerated in the US by post-conviction DNA testing. The Innocence
Project - Know the Cases, online: Innocence Project < http://www.innocenceproject.org >.
The exonerated probably represent only a small fraction of the total number of wrongly
convicted persons, since DNA evidence is often unavailable and there is frequently no other
way to substantiate a claim of innocence. See e.g. David Lazer & Michelle N. Meyer, "DNA
and the Criminal Justice System: Consensus and Debate" in David Lazer ed., DNA and the
CrirninalJustice System: The Technology ofJustice (Boston: MIT Press, 2004) 357 at 367-68.
3. Among the books and articles dealing with the causes of wrongful convictions are
Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer, Actual Innocence: When Justice Goes Wrong
and How to Make it Right (New York: Signet, 2001); Saundra D. Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey, eds., Wrongly Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2001); C. Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner & Edward Sagarin,
Convicted But Innocent. Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy (Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage, 1996); Brandon L. Garrett, "Judging Innocence" (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55; and
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, "Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases" (1987) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21. For a report commissioned by an organization of
Canadian prosecutors, see Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FPT) Heads of Prosecutions
Committee Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, Report on the
Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2004), online:
< http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hop/PreventionOfMiscarriagesfJustice.pdf >.
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cases.4 A wealth of recent scholarship sheds light on the systemic factors
that tend to produce wrongful convictions.
The research reveals that certain forms of proof are associated with
wrongful convictions. Some important causes of wrongful
convictions are only indirectly related to questions of evidence - for
example, police tunnel vision, prosecutorial misconduct and
incompetent defence advocacy.5 But a striking proportion of wrongful
convictions flow from unreliable prosecution evidence of a few kinds:
mistaken eyewitness identification evidence, perjured jailhouse
informant testimony, false confessions and "junk" science from
untrustworthy forensic experts.6  The link between erroneous
convictions and these particular forms of proof raises the possibility that
verdict errors can be prevented through new or improved evidence
4. On the day the convictions of the Birmingham Six were quashed, a Royal Commission
was announced with the broad mandate to review criminal justice processes in England and
Wales. See U.K., Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Cm. 2263, Report (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1993) (Chair: Garry Runciman). Case-specific public inquiries
have become the typical response to wrongful convictions in Canada. See Newfoundland
and Labrador, Lamer Commission of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of: Ronald Dalton,
Gregory Parsons, Randy Druken, Report (St. John's: Communications and Consultation
Branch, 2006), online: <http://www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/lamer/> (Chair: Antonio
Lamer) [Lamer Commission Report]; Manitoba, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow,
Report (Winnipeg: Manitoba Justice, 2001), online: <http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/
publications/sophonow/> (Chair: Peter Cory) [Sopbonow Inquiry Report]; and Ontario,
Kaufman Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, Report (Toronto: Ministry
of the Attorney General, 1998), online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/about/pubs/morin/> (Chair: Fred Kaufman) [Kaufnan Commission Report].
5. These factors have been identified as major contributors to wrongful convictions. See
e.g. Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, supra note 3 at 361.
6. Garrett, supra note 3 at 76. (calculating that eyewitness mistake, faulty forensic evidence,
perjurious informant testimony and false confessions were factors contributing to wrongful
convictions in 79%, 57%, 18% and 16%, respectively, of the first 200 DNA exonerations in
the US. See also Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, ibid. at 361; Huff, Rattner & Sagarin, supra note
3 at 64; Westervelt & Humphrey, supra note 3 at 5-6; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 3 at 56-57;
and Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages oflustice, supra note 3 at 3.
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rules. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently updated a number of
evidentiary rules to respond better to the risk of wrongful convictions.7
Worries that innocent people may be convicted on the basis of
unreliable evidence are most acute in jury trials. Because jurors are
untrained and generally unfamiliar with the justice system, they often
lack the experience and knowledge required to evaluate the
prosecution's evidence. Forensic experience and social science research
have revealed that certain forms of apparently creditworthy evidence are
surprisingly unreliable, but lay jurors may overlook these reliability
problems. And while their common sense approach to finding facts is in
many respects advantageous,' juries can be led astray by common sense
beliefs that are misguided. For instance, they may rely too easily on
eyewitness identification evidence. Where common sense views of
prosecution evidence depart from more sceptical perspectives informed
by social science and judicial experience, there is a serious risk of jury
error.
This paper weighs the regulatory options and proposes a set of
reforms to trial evidence rules intended to mitigate the danger that juries
will over-rely on untrustworthy prosecution evidence. Admittedly, trial
rules of evidence represent only one - and probably not the most
effective - set of safeguards for the innocent. Other avenues of reform,
including improvements in pre-trial police procedures, may have more
potential to reduce the number of wrongful convictions. However, trial
7. See e.g. R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 at paras. 139-40, 150-52
(accused's prior discreditable conduct); R. v. Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445 at
paras. 50-51 [Hibbert] (eyewitness identification); R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R.
144 at para. 200 (hearsay); R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 36 [Oickle]
(confessions); and R. v. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237 at paras. 81, 127-30
[Brooks] (jailhouse informant testimony).
8. As a body of ordinary people charged with applying the law, juries are said to draw
on common sense notions of justice and give voice to the conscience of the larger
community. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Jury in Criminal Trials
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1980) at 8. Moreover it is often argued
that common sense normally serves as a trustworthy guide to reasoning from evidence in
the search for truth. See L. Jonathan Cohen, "Freedom of Proof" in William Twining,
ed., Facts in Law (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983) 1 at 5.
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evidence rules remain the accused's last defence against conviction on
the basis of unreliable evidence.
The discussion in this paper focuses on three forms of evidence
known to pose reliability problems and to raise a risk of wrongful
convictions, especially in jury cases: eyewitness identification evidence,
confessions and jailhouse informant testimony. After a brief discussion
of the existing Canadian approach to these forms of proof, the second
and third parts of the analysis delve into the two basic choices
underlying this set of evidence rules. The first choice is one of method.
Is it wiser to educate juries about the weaknesses of prosecution
evidence or to compensate directly for their tendency to overvalue it by
limiting their adjudicative freedom? The second choice is between two
sources of knowledge. If jurors' common sense understandings of
prosecution evidence are misguided, against whose understanding
should their view be measured and corrected? Courts might invite input
from psychological experts, or might rely instead on their own
experience and knowledge. These choices involve some difficult trade-
offs, and the paper closes with a proposal for a flexible regulatory
scheme with a richer blend of educating and limiting rules and of expert
and judicial knowledge.
I. Fundamentals of the Existing Approach
Eyewitness identification evidence, confessions and jailhouse
informant testimony raise common problems: each can offer persuasive,
even damning, evidence of guilt; each has proven potentially unreliable
and vulnerable to overvaluation by triers of fact; and each is strongly
associated with wrongful criminal convictions. In Canada, each is
governed by special evidentiary rules, and in all three areas these rules
have recently been restated by the Supreme Court.9 The rules aim to
bridge the gap between juries' common sense understandings and more
9. See Hibbert, supra note 7 (eyewitness identification evidence); Brooks, supra note 7
(jailhouse informant testimony); and Oickle, supra note 7 (confessions).
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informed perspectives on the psychology of proof and the causes of
adjudicative error. 10
A. Eyewitness Identification Evidence
This gap yawns widest in the area of eyewitness testimony.
Witnesses who see the perpetrator of an offence frequently make
mistakes when asked to identify that person. Psychologists and lawyers
have known for generations that eyewitness identification evidence can
be dangerously unreliable." But their professional scepticism seems out
of step with the views of ordinary people, who tend to find eyewitness
testimony highly persuasive and often harbour misconceptions about
the factors that predict its accuracy. 2  To take one example,
psychological research has shown that an eyewitness' expressed level of
confidence in identifying the suspect is the most important factor in
persuading a jury to believe the witness. 3 This attention to eyewitness
confidence is misguided: empirical evidence shows that it is only weakly
correlated to identification accuracy. 4 Eyewitness certainty not only
10. See Gary T. Trotter, "False Confessions and Wrongful Convictions" (2004) 35
Ottawa L. Rev. 179 at 210 (discussing the "gap in our knowledge" between the judiciary
and juries respecting false confessions).
11. See e.g. Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1932) at viii (detailing 65 wrongful conviction cases and identifying eyewitness
misidentification as one of their three main causes).
12. For a recent review of the science, see Gary L. Wells, "Eyewitness Identifications:
Specific Status" in David L. Faigman et al., eds., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and
Science of Expert Testimony, vol. 2 (St. Paul: West Group, 2005) c. 20 at Part. II, s. 20:43
[Wells, "Eyewitness Identifications"]. See also Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod,
Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology, and the Law (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) at 171-209 (reviewing survey research, mock juror experiments
and other studies demonstrating that lay people lack knowledge of certain important
findings in eyewitness psychology and are insensitive to the factors correlated with
identification accuracy); Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony:
Civil and Criminal, 3d ed. (Charlottesville: Lexis Law Publishing, 1997) at 6-
8 (cataloguing various widespread misconceptions about eyewitness memory).
13. E.g. Wells, "Eyewitness Identifications", ibid., s. 20:39; and Loftus & Doyle, ibid. at 328.
14. E.g. Loftus & Doyle, ibid. at 328; and Wells, ibid., s. 20:41.
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leads jurors to overestimate its significance, but may also lead them to
neglect other factors more predictive of accuracy. 5
Much more could be said about the frailties of eyewitness testimony,
but for present purposes it suffices to observe that jurors' common sense
understandings of identification evidence can be dangerously misguided.
Fortunately, Canadian courts have long recognized this problem, 6 and
they have not left juries to assess such evidence without assistance. A
jury is allowed to convict on the strength of uncorroborated eyewitness
testimony, 7  but whenever the prosecution relies on eyewitness
identification testimony that is contested by the defence, the trial judge
must caution the jury on its frailties. 8 This warning should both alert
the jury to the general need for caution in relying on eyewitness
evidence and highlight any particular weaknesses of such eyewitness
testimony in the case.' 9 Canadian eyewitness instructions include
numerous propositions drawn from the psychological literature: for
example, juries may be told that the link between eyewitness confidence
and accuracy is very weak,2" or that witnesses have more difficulty
identifying perpetrators of another race than perpetrators who are of
their own race.2' While the precise terms of the instruction depend on
15. See Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Thomas E. Stuve, "Juror Decision Making
in Eyewitness Identification Cases" (1988) 12 Law & Human Behavior 41 (reporting a
mock juror study in which several factors relevant to eyewitness accuracy were
manipulated in the course of a videotaped mock trial: of the factors manipulated, only
eyewitness confidence had a measurable effect on verdicts).
16. On eyewitness certainty, see e.g. R. v. Atfield (2005), 42 A.R. 294 at para. 3 (C.A.).
17. R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197 at 1211 [Nikolovski]; Accord United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 at 554 (D.C. Cir. 1972) [Telfaire].
18. R. v. Mezzo, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802 at 845 [Mezzo]; Hibbert, supra note 7 at para. 79,
Bastarache J., dissenting; R. v. Carey (1996), 113 C.C.C. (3d) 74 at 79-80 (Qc. C.A.); and R.
v. Haughton (2004), 187 O.A.C. 67.
19. R. v. Canning, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 991 [Canning]; Hibbert, ibid. at paras. 53, 81; R. v.
Baltovich (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 481 at 504-05 (C.A.); and R. v. Miller (1998), 131 C.C.C.
(3d) 141 (Ont. C.A.).
20. Hibbert, ibid. at para. 52 (approving such an instruction).
21. See e.g. Wells, "Eyewitness Identifications", supra note 12, s. 15-2.2.2 (reviewing
psychological findings on cross-racial identification); and R. v. Richards (2004), 70 O.R.
(2008) 33 Queen's L.J.
the particular facts, appellate courts have offered extensive guidance and
the general practice has been synthesized and regularized through
pattern jury instructions.2
One can, of course, conceive of other trial procedures that could
guard against the danger of wrongful convictions based on eyewitness
mistake, such as expert evidence and directed acquittals, but Canadian
courts rely on cautionary jury instructions to the exclusion of these
alternatives. While expert testimony on eyewitness psychology is
regularly admitted in the United States and continues to draw support
from a majority of legal commentators throughout North America ,23
expert evidence on the general frailties of eyewitness identification is
(3d) 737 (holding that the jury should have been instructed on the frailties of cross-racial
identification).
22. See e.g. Gerry A. Ferguson, Michael R. Dambrot & Elizabeth A. Bennett, CRIMJ:
Canadian Criminal Jury Instructions, 4th ed. (Vancouver: The Continuing Legal
Education Society of British Columbia, 2005) s. 4.55; and David Watt, Ontario Specimen
Jury Instructions (Criminal) (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 165-68.
23. Most American jurisdictions afford trial judges discretion to permit experts to testify
about the frailties of eyewitness identification. E.g. State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn. 2d 626 at
645 (2003): "[A]t this point the significant majority of federal and state courts addressing
the question have held that such evidence is admissible under an abuse of discretion
standard." American commentators who have argued in favour of admitting expert
evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification include Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A.
Dauphinais & Martin A. Safer, "A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error" (2007) 97 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 807; Roger B. Handberg, "Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury" (1995) 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1013;
and Michael R. Leippe, "The Case For Expert Testimony about Eyewitness Memory"
(1995) 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 909 [Leippe, "Eyewitness Memory"]. Canadian jurists
who have argued in favour of admission include Jill Copeland, "Helping Jurors
Recognize the Frailties of Eyewitness Identification Evidence" (2002) 46 Crim. L.Q. 188
at 202, 207; and Dianne L. Martin, "When the Rules are Wrong: Wrongful Convictions
and the Rules of Evidence: Lessons from Commissions of Inquiry" (Material prepared for
the Criminal Lawyers Association Annual Convention and Education Programme, 12-13
November 1999) [Quicklaw: Ontario Criminal Lawyers Association Papers,
OCLARP/1999-020].
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inadmissible in Canada. 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a
trial judge may not direct an acquittal when the prosecution's case
depends on poor quality, unsupported identification evidence. 5 Rather,
juries are to be permitted to evaluate that evidence after being properly
cautioned, 6 and any frailties go only to weight and not to admissibility.
Commentators have suggested that courts should have the power to
direct acquittals or exclude identification evidence in weak eyewitness
cases.17 Occasionally, a court agrees; the Ontario Court of Appeal
suggested in two recent cases that eyewitnesses could be barred from
purporting to identify the accused as the perpetrator for the first time in
court.2 8 However, courts normally admit all identification evidence and
leave it to the jury to assess its value.29
B. Confessions
Like eyewitness testimony, confession evidence can be surprisingly
unreliable. Ordinary people view confessions as extremely persuasive,
often conclusive, evidence of guilt." Indeed, social science research
24. See R. v. McIntosh (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 97 at 105 (C.A.) [McIntosh], leave to appeal to the
S.C.C. refused, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 610 [McIntosh]; R. v. Fengstad (1994), 27 C.R. (4th) 383
(B.C.C.A.) [Fengstad]; andR. v. Audy (No. 2) (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 231 (Ont. C.A.).
25. Mezzo, supra note 18.
26. Ibid. at 845.
27. Kent Roach, "Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for
Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions" (2007)
52 Crim. L.Q. 210. Lamer Commission Report, supra note 4 at 168 (advocating that trial
judges be given broader powers to throw out weak cases generally).
28. R. v. Tebo (2003), 175 C.C.C. (3d) 116 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Holmes (2002), 62 O.R.
(3d) 146 (C.A.).
29. E.g. Hibbert, supra note 7 at para. 49 (ruling that in-court identifications were
properly admitted, despite an "almost total absence of value as reliable positive
identification").
30. E.g. R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449 at para. 14 [Hodgson]; and Peter Brooks,
Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000) at 4. See also Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, "On the Power
of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference
Hypothesis" (1997) 21 Law & Human Behavior 469 (reporting a series of mock juror
(2008) 33 Queen's L.J.
suggests the existence of a widely-held belief that only torture could
cause an innocent person to confess to a crime. 1 Canadian courts have
acknowledged that the very idea of a false confession may be counter-
intuitive to jurors.2 Yet, however improbable it seems, innocent people
not infrequently confess guilt and expose themselves to criminal
punishment. Many such false confessions are "police-induced" in the
sense that they are extracted from reluctant suspects by interrogators.3
Confessions can be dangerous items of evidence indeed if jurors are
inclined to dismiss the very possibility that a person who has confessed
might be innocent. 4
Even jurors who recognize this danger are unlikely to understand
why some suspects confess falsely and to know the features that
distinguish false confessions from trustworthy ones. 5 It is difficult to see
how a fact-finder could properly assess the value of a retracted
confession without some grasp of these issues. The psychological
studies in which confession evidence was seen as more important by jurors and had more
of an effect on verdicts than other powerful kinds of evidence); and Saul M. Kassin &
Holly Sukel, "Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the 'Harmless
Error' Rule" (1997) 21 Law & Human Behavior 27 at 44 ("the presence of any confession
powerfully increased the conviction rate [in these mock juror studies] - even when it was
seen as coerced, even when it was ruled inadmissible, and even when participants claimed
it did not affect their verdicts").
31. E.g. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, "The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation" (1998) 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 at 444. See also Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1992) at 234. Empirical support for the existence of this belief derives from
two studies in which mock jurors discounted confessions elicited by threats but did not
discount the value of confessions elicited by promises of lenient treatment. Saul M. Kassin
& Lawrence S. Wrightsman, "Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instructions, and Mock Juror
Verdicts" (1981) 11 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 489 [Kassin & Wrightsman, "Coerced
Confessions"]; and Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, "Prior Confessions and
Mock Juror Verdicts" (1980) 10 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 133.
32. Oickle, supra note 7 at para. 34; and R. v. Swanek (2005), 28 C.R. (6th) 93 at 97 (Ont. C.A.).
33. For case studies and discussion of "police-induced false confessions," see Leo &
Ofshe, supra note 31.
34. See ibid. at 429.
35. See e.g. Trotter, supra note 10 at 188.
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literature suggests that two factors contribute to false confessions: the
suspect's vulnerabilities and the coercive or manipulative features of the
interrogation. 6 Vulnerable individuals who are more suggestible or
compliant than the average are especially likely to offer false confessions
under the pressures of police interrogation - young people, for
example, or those suffering from mental illnesses or deficits.37 But even
mentally normal adults have been known to confess falsely to serious
crimes in the face of prolonged police questioning. 8 Modern methods of
psychological interrogation use pressure, deceit and manipulation to
erode a suspect's will not to confess.39 These techniques are intended for
use against guilty suspects, but they can also elicit confessions from the
innocent.4 °
Canadian law recognizes the danger of police-induced false
confessions. The primary check on unreliable confession evidence is the
voluntariness or "confessions rule," which makes an out-of-court
statement of an accused to a person in authority inadmissible against the
accused unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
the statement was voluntary.41 Although the touchstone of admissibility
is voluntariness, not reliability, the confessions rule is thought to
exclude many unreliable confessions. 42 A confession may be rendered
involuntary, among other reasons, if it is elicited through police
coercion involving threats of harm or promises of leniency, or if the
circumstances of the interrogation are oppressive, as when a suspect is
denied sleep, food, clothing or water.43 These same coercive and
36. E.g. Gisli H. Gudjonsson & James A.C. MacKeith, "Retracted Confessions: Legal,
Psychological and Psychiatric Aspects" (1988) 28 Med. Sci. & Law 187 at 191.
37. E.g. Christopher Sherrin, "False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law"
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J. 601.
38. E.g. Gudjonsson, supra note 31 at 234.
39. Ibid. at 24, 47.
40. Ibid. at 48.
41. Hodgson, supra note 30 at para. 12; R. v. Erven, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926 at 931; and R. v.
Sabri (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 179 at 185 (Ont. C.A.).
42. Oickle, supra note 7.
43. Ibid. at paras. 47-62.
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oppressive tactics have been known to result in false confessions." Thus,
the confessions rule seems reasonably well-calibrated to exclude some
unreliable confessions.
In the leading case of Oickle, the Supreme Court recognized that the
primary rationale for excluding involuntary confessions is to prevent
wrongful convictions.45 Drawing heavily on the false confessions
literature, the Court accepted that confessions have proven false in
"hundreds of cases," described the different types of false confessions
catalogued by researchers and discussed the circumstances in which
police are most likely to elicit false confessions.46 The Supreme Court
has thereby put its imprimatur on the findings of false confessions
researchers, but there is currently no way to communicate these
findings to jurors who may be called upon to assess the reliability of a
retracted confession. Expert evidence on the general phenomenon of
false confessions has been admitted in foreign courts but never, to this
point, in Canadian trials.47 Moreover, judges do not warn juries of the
possibility that a confession may be false, or offer them any information
bearing on the reliability of retracted confessions. Juries are simply
instructed that it is for them to determine whether a confession was
made, whether it was true and how much weight to give it.48 These
skeletal instructions shed no light on the features of psychological
44. E.g. ibid.; and Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, "The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and Irrational Action" (1997) 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 979 at 997-1000.
45. Oickle, supra note 7 at paras. 32, 68.
46. Ibid. at paras. 34-46.
47. Foreign cases approving the use of false confessions expert evidence include United
States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 at 1345 (7th Cir. 1996) [Hall]; and R. v. Fell, [2001] EWCA
Crim. 696. The leading Canadian cases on this point are R. v. Osmar (2007), 44 C.R. (6th)
276 (Ont. C.A.) [Osmar] (ruling expert evidence on false confessions inadmissible in the
circumstances, but leaving open the possibility that such expert testimony might be
admitted in an appropriate case); and R. v. Warren, [1995] 3 W.W.R. 371 (N.W.T.S.C.),
aff'd 117 C.C.C. (3d) 418 (N.W.T.C.A.) [Warren] (excluding expert evidence on whether
the circumstances in which the accused confessed made the confession unreliable). See
also Trotter, supra note 10 at 198-200 (discussing and rejecting the use of expert evidence
and jury instructions on the general phenomenon of false confessions).
48. R. v. Mulligan, [1955] O.R. 240 (C.A.); and R. v. Rustad, [1965] S.C.R. 555.
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interrogation that result in false confessions, and do little to counteract
the common sense belief that innocent suspects do not confess.
C. Jailhouse Informant Testimony
Juries also have difficulty evaluating the testimony of jailhouse
informants - that is, inmates who come forward as potential witnesses,
claiming to have heard confessions from fellow prisoners while they
were incarcerated together.49 They can be important prosecution
witnesses, often testifying that the accused admitted guilt and
volunteered details about the crime. Since few species of evidence are as
powerful as an acknowledgement of guilt from the mouth of the
accused, jailhouse informant testimony can be highly persuasive. But
experience reveals that these witnesses frequently testify to admissions
that were never made, and their perjury has been identified as a leading
cause of wrongful convictions. Jailhouse informants are often waiting to
be tried or sentenced by the same criminal justice system they claim to
assist, 50  and their typical concern is only to advance their own
interests.51
The obvious reliability problems with jailhouse informant testimony
have not deterred officials from frequently crediting these witnesses'
accounts of jailhouse confessions. Jailhouse informants can often lie to
investigators and on the stand with a reassuring combination of fluency,
comfort and apparent conviction.52 They invent plausible confessions
using information patched together from media reports, documentary
evidence disclosed by the prosecution and left in the possession of the
accused, and case-related discussions with innocent suspects.53 Relying
49. See Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 598; Report on the Prevention of
Miscarriages ofJustice, supra note 3 at 75; and Christopher Sherrin, "Jailhouse Informants,
Part I: Problems with their Use" (1997) 40 Crim. L.Q. 106 at 107 [Sherrin, "Jailhouse
Informants Part I"].
50. See Sherrin, "Jailhouse Informants Part I", ibid. at 107.
51. Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 599.
52. See e.g. Sophonow Inquiry Report, supra note 4 at 70-71
53. See e.g. Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 555, 565.
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on such sources and their own ingenuity, these witnesses often convince
investigators that their information could only have come from the
perpetrator of the offence.54 Given the facility with which jailhouse
informants have been able to hoodwink criminal justice officials, there
is little reason to believe that juries will be skilled at detecting this kind
of perjury.55 As ordinary citizens, they are likely to be unaware of both
the dismal track record of jailhouse informants as a class of witnesses
and the ways in which those informants concoct believable testimony. 6
Canadian courts have bemoaned the role of jailhouse informants in
bringing about wrongful convictions,57 and they have tried to control
the problem through evidentiary regulation. When the prosecution calls
a jailhouse informant in a criminal jury trial, the judge normally warns
the jury about the perils of relying on the informant's unsupported
testimony.58 The Supreme Court has held that when the prosecution
relies on any "unsavoury" witness whose credibility is seriously in
doubt, circumstances may call for "a clear and sharp warning to attract
the attention of the juror to the risks of adopting, without more, the
evidence of the witness."59 The decision to offer such a "Vetrovec
warning" lies within the discretion of the trial judge and does not
depend on the "class" to which the witness belongs.60 No particular
form of words is required, but the caution should single out the
unsavoury witness for careful scrutiny, highlight the reasons why the
witness may be untruthful, and alert the jury to the danger of relying
54. See e.g. Sophonow Inquiry Report, supra note 4 at 71.
55. Ibid. at 70; and Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 600.
56. Sherrin, "Jailhouse Informants Part I", supra note 49 at 117-18.
57. See e.g. Brooks, supra note 7; and R. v. Sauv (2004), 182 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.) [Sauve].
58. See Brooks, ibid.
59. SeeR. v. Vetrovec, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 at 831 [Vetrovec].
60. Ibid. at 830-32. See also R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525 at 557; and R. v. Campbell
(2002), 163 C.C.C. (3d) 485 at para. 13 [footnotes omitted] [N.S.C.A.] ("The Supreme
Court of Canada has rejected a caution based upon categories of witnesses in favour of a
principled and subjective approach. The warning may be required for any unsavoury
witness. This would include accomplices, jailhouse informants or persons with a lengthy
criminal record").
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upon his or her testimony unless they find other evidence to support
it.
6 1
Decisions about whether to offer a Vetrovec warning, and its precise
contents, normally lie within the discretion of trial judges. However,
the law mandates a strong Vetrovec warning in certain cases, and
criminal convictions are regularly overturned on the basis that it was
not offered.62 In deciding whether such a warning is required as a matter
of law, courts weigh the reasons to suspect that the unsavoury witness
may be untruthful and the importance of his or her testimony to the
prosecution's case: the more untrustworthy the witness and the more
crucial the evidence, the more likely that a clear and sharp credibility
warning will be required.63 In effect, judges are required to warn juries
in accordance with Vetrovec when unsavoury witness testimony appears
so unreliable, or so basic to the case against the accused, that it would
run a clear risk of producing an erroneous conviction.
64
Moreover, although the law on unsavoury witness warnings does
not depend on any rigid categorization of witnesses, certain witnesses
continue to be regarded with great suspicion by the courts. Bitter
experience has made jailhouse informants an important modern "class"
of suspect witnesses, and a clear and sharp warning is normally required
when their evidence is important to the prosecution's case. 65 Given the
serious danger of wrongful convictions grounded on jailhouse
informant testimony, there have been proposals to severely limit its use,
61. See Vetrovec, ibid.; Brooks, supra note 7 at para. 94; and Sauvi, supra note 57 at 356.
62. E.g. R. v. Bevan, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599 (warning mandatory where two witnesses were
disreputable criminal associates of the accused, and one was also an accessory after the fact
to the offense being tried); R. v. Bromley (2000), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Nfld. C.A.)
(warnings mandatory where complainants all had long criminal records) [Bromley]; and
Sauvi, ibid. (warnings mandatory for three witnesses who had lied to police, were career
criminals, sought benefits for their testimony, and were heavy drug users).
63. Brooks, supra note 7.
64. See e.g. Bromley, supra note 62; R. v. MacDonald, 2000 NSCA 60, 184 N.S.R. (2d) 1 at
para. 166 [MacDonald].
65. R. v. Chandra (2005), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 80 (Alta. C.A.). See also Brooks, supra note 7 at
para 130 (Binnie, J., concurring); and MacDonald, ibid. at para. 166.
65. Sophonow Inquiry Report, supra note 4 at 72-73.
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either by making it generally inadmissible66 or by vesting trial judges
with the power to exclude it when it does not meet some minimum
standard of reliability.67 To this point, however, there exists no
legislative or common law basis in Canada for trial judges to remove
even the most unreliable jailhouse informant testimony from the jury's
consideration. Defence attempts to have such testimony excluded have
been rebuffed on the strength of the principle that the quality and
weight of the evidence are for the jury to decide.68
D. A Broad Perspective
The trial evidence rules described in this part can be briefly
summarized as follows. Some unreliable confessions are removed from
the jury's consideration by the voluntary confessions rule. Research
illuminating the nature and causes of police-induced false confessions
informs this exclusionary rule but is not considered a proper subject of
expert evidence or jury instructions. By contrast, eyewitness
identification evidence and jailhouse informant testimony are normally
controlled only by judicial warnings to the jury. They cannot be
excluded on grounds related to reliability and expert evidence shedding
light on the factors affecting their reliability is inadmissible. Of course,
there have been dissenting voices. Occasionally a court opines that
evidence which would normally be the subject of a cautionary jury
instruction should be excluded. Commentators have joined in calls to
exclude certain unreliable eyewitness and jailhouse informant testimony,
and have decried the exclusion of expert evidence on eyewitness
psychology. On the whole, however, the law governing these forms of
66. Ibid.
67. Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 623; Christopher Sherrin, "Jailhouse
Informants in the Canadian Criminal Justice System, Part II: Options for Reform" (1997)
40 Crim. L.Q. 157 at 179-84 [Sherrin, "Jailhouse Informants Part II].
68. E.g. MacDonald, supra note 64 at paras. 93-97 (holding that judges have no discretion
to exclude unreliable jailhouse informant testimony). See also R. v. Buric (1996), 28 O.R.
(3d) 737 (C.A.), aff'd [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535 [Buric] (confirming that unreliability does not
affect admissibility); and R. v. Monteleone, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 154 (holding that the weight of
the evidence is for the jury).
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evidence remains remarkably simple and consistent: the dangers of
eyewitness mistake and jailhouse informant perjury are dealt with
through cautionary jury instructions, while the problem of false
confessions is controlled through an exclusionary rule.
Considering these three forms of proof together brings into focus
two important general principles underlying the existing law. The first
might be called the principle of exclusivity: the notion that for each
category of unreliable prosecution evidence there should be only one
procedural corrective. Under current law, whether jurors will be
instructed on the frailties of unreliable evidence or will have that
evidence taken away from them altogether depends entirely on the type
of evidence at issue. The categories of proof in question (confessions,
eyewitness testimony and jailhouse informant testimony) are tightly
coupled with particular procedural techniques - exclusion or jury
instructions, as the case may be. The exclusivity principle has been
endorsed most explicitly in connection with eyewitness expert
testimony, which is said to be unnecessary because juries receive the
information they need through cautionary instructions.69 And while the
exclusivity principle is not always clearly stated, it structures the entire
set of rules governing unreliable prosecution evidence. In short,
Canadian evidence law favours efficiency and abhors redundancy.
Courts are generally unwilling to consider introducing a new
evidentiary safeguard to address a reliability problem that has already
been addressed by an existing rule.
The second key underlying principle might be labeled the principle
of precision. These evidentiary rules are intended to precisely target and
protect the innocent; they aim to distinguish accurately between
innocent and guilty accused, and to safeguard the former but not the
latter from conviction. No rule can be perfectly precise in this sense
because all defensive safeguards are also "barriers to conviction" that can
benefit the guilty as well as the innocent. 70 To some extent, acquittals of
69. See e.g. McIntosh, supra note 24 at 105; and Fengstad, supra note 24.
70. See e.g., Mirjan Dama~ka, "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study" (1973) 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506 at 508, 576.
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the guilty are accepted as the price of preventing wrongful convictions.71
But courts are reluctant to pay this price, and they prefer safeguards that
target the innocent to mere barriers hampering effective prosecution.
The law on unreliable prosecution evidence reveals that Canadian courts
are profoundly committed to the precision principle, which they seek to
uphold by borrowing liberally from social science findings on the
psychology of evidence and wrongful convictions. Information on the
nature and causes of false confessions has been drawn into the
voluntariness rule, while cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness
identification have incorporated psychological findings about eyewitness
memory. Presumably, courts hope that increased familiarity with these
bodies of knowledge is making judges and juries ever more sensitive to
the factors affecting reliability, and ever more able to distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate evidence and between guilty and
innocent accused.
The precision and exclusivity principles represent the warp and woof
of the rules on unreliable prosecution evidence. Precision serves the
fundamental criminal justice policy of protecting the innocent from
wrongful conviction without unduly compromising the basic criminal
law goal of identifying and punishing the guilty. Exclusivity permits the
procedural law to develop in a way that is streamlined and easy to
apply. Connected as it is with the moral foundations of the criminal
law, the precision principle should take precedence over the exclusivity
principle, which serves the important but secondary goal of efficiency.
However, the existing law on unreliable prosecution evidence inverts
these priorities. By upholding one-size-fits-all rules that apply to all
evidence in a given category but that are not particularly well targeted to
prevent wrongful convictions, Canadian courts have adhered to the
exclusivity principle at the expense of the precision principle. The
analysis that follows will suggest that the best way to protect the
innocent would be to develop a fuller spectrum of procedural responses
to the problem of unreliable prosecution evidence in criminal jury trials.
71. See e.g. D.J. Galligan, "More Scepticism About Scepticism" (1988) 8 Oxford J. Legal
Stud. 249 at 259.
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II. Two Methods
A jury's tendency to rely too heavily on a given form of evidence
can be controlled in two basic ways. First, courts can combat the jury's
knowledge deficit with information, sensitizing jurors to reliability
problems in hopes that they will place neither too much nor too little
weight on the prosecution's evidence. Alternatively, courts can suppress
the jury's use of the evidence by restricting its freedom to access or
evaluate it. For present purposes, I label these two jury control methods,
respectively, educating and limiting the jury. Canadian courts normally
educate jurors by giving them cautionary instructions, and limit them
by excluding evidence.72
As far back as the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham distinguished
between evidence rules "addressed to the will" and measures "addressed
to the understanding." 73 He favoured eliminating mandatory rules, like
exclusionary rules, which are addressed to the will and designed to tie
the hands of the fact finder,74 but he endorsed the use of instructions to
enrich the fact finder's understanding of the value of evidence.
75
Bentham's prescription has not been wholly implemented in any
common law jurisdiction: exclusionary rules remain at the centre of the
law of evidence. However, his insight that evidentiary regulation can
either override or seek to improve the fact finder's view of the evidence
is still relevant today, since both limiting and educating rules form a part
of modern evidence law. This part of the paper looks at the relative
merits of using limiting and educating rules to alleviate the risk of
wrongful convictions on the basis of unreliable prosecution evidence.
72. These are not the only possible jury control techniques. Permitting expert testimony
on the frailties of unreliable evidence represents another potential method of educating
the jury, while corroboration requirements constitute another kind of limiting rule. See
Philip McNamara, "The Canons of Evidence - Rules of Exclusion or Rules of Use?"
(1985) 10 Adel. L. Rev. 341 at 344 (classifying corroboration rules as "rules qualifying or
restricting the powers of the tribunal offact").
73. William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (Stanford: Stanford
UP, 1985) at 28.
74. Ibid. at 43.
75. Ibid. at 28. See also Galligan, supra note 71 at 256.
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A. Limiting the Jury
Limiting rules bar juries from relying on particular items of
evidence. The simplest way to do this is to exclude the evidence.
Another kind of limiting rule that has been used in common law
jurisdictions is corroboration requirements, which prevent juries from
convicting on the basis of certain forms of evidence without extrinsic
support. Commentators occasionally advocate strict corroboration rules
on unreliable evidence,76 but such rules have fallen out of favour and are
now essentially unknown to Canadian law. Exclusionary rules, too,
have become fewer in number. Like generations of jurists who came
before, the Supreme Court of Canada has announced its preference for
admitting evidence and permitting the trier of fact to consider any
doubts about its weight." Let there be no mistake, however. The
Supreme Court's expressed preferences notwithstanding, rules excluding
evidence (from hearsay to coerced confessions) still form the core of
Canadian evidence law.
(i) Strengths of Exclusionary Rules
Excluding evidence represents a natural, if extreme, response to the
risk that juries may put too much stock in unreliable evidence. Juries
cannot over-rely on inadmissible evidence because they cannot rely on it
at all. Compelling fact finders to make their decisions without regard to
76. E.g. Alex Stein, "The Refoundation of Evidence Law" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Juris. 279
at 333 (advocating corroboration requirements with respect to those "particular kinds of
evidence [that] give rise to serious concerns about their creditworthiness," including
confessions and eyewitness and accomplice testimony).
77. Nikolovski, supra note 17 at 1208 citing R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 at 455,
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., concurring. The modern court's expressed distaste for exclusion is
remarkably similar to Cockburn C.J.'s declaration in 1861: "People were formerly
frightened out of their wits about admitting evidence, lest juries should go wrong. In
modern times we admit the evidence and discuss its weight." Quoted in John Henry
Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 1, rev. by Peter Tillers (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1983) at s. 10.
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certain evidence alleviates the danger that common sense
misapprehensions about that evidence may lead juries astray.
a. Effectiveness
Thus, the main advantage of exclusion is that it is a simple and
effective safeguard for the innocent. No doubt, for example, the
confessions rule prevents some wrongful convictions by catching some
of the most unreliable confessions, including those elicited through
police coercion or oppression.8
b. Restraining Public Officials
Another advantage of exclusionary rules is that, by prohibiting the
use of the evidence, they bring consequences when public officials act
improperly or violate suspects' rights. Thus, exclusion seems
particularly fitting when evidentiary regulation aims both to prevent
erroneous convictions and to discourage official misconduct.7 9 Here
again, the confessions rule provides an apt example: involuntary
confessions are inadmissible under Canadian law because they are
unreliable but also, importantly, because they are the products of official
coercion.8" A special concern with state action is reflected in the fact that
the exclusionary rule applies only to statements made to police officers
and others involved in investigating or detaining the suspect." Reducing
the use of coercive interrogation techniques is an important goal in itself
and could also be expected to reduce the number of false confessions
obtained from innocent suspects.
78. See supra notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text.
79. See e.g. David M. Paciocco, Charter Principles and Proof in Criminal Cases (Toronto:
Carswell, 1987) at 337 [Paciocco, Charter Principles].
80. See Hodgson, supra note 30 at para. 14; and R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 at 932.
81. Hodgson, ibid. at para. 24.
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(ii) Weaknesses of Exclusionary Rules
The weaknesses of exclusionary rules are the converse of their
strengths. Because they are so drastic, exclusionary rules succeed in
preventing wrongful convictions and in disciplining public officials. But
they impose burdens on the justice system that weigh heavily against
them.
a. Cost
An exclusionary rule requires trial judges to devote courtroom
resources to deciding the question of admissibility, for example, by
holding a voir dire to determine the voluntariness of each confession.82
However, the most serious potential drawback of exclusion is the cost
of missing information. Excluding prosecution evidence hampers efforts
to enforce the criminal law and interferes with the search for truth.
Ultimately, one cannot separate reliable from unreliable evidence and
valuable from misleading information in any universally valid,
categorical way. Despite their dangers, eyewitness identification,
confessions and jailhouse informant testimony do often amount to
powerful evidence of guilt. Any broad rule excluding them would be
disastrous; vast amounts of valuable information would be lost and the
ensuing acquittals would be a windfall to the guilty.
b. Scope of Protection
Given this high cost, it would seem rational to exclude evidence
only where concerns about reliability are most acute. Thus, one might
expect that the range of cases where unreliable evidence is actually
excluded would be quite narrow and the scope of protection offered
by exclusionary rules correspondingly limited. An exclusionary rule
directed at preventing juries from over-relying on deceptive
prosecution evidence would likely be narrow enough to exclude some
82. Ibid. at para. 41.
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of the most unreliable evidence but let in some of questionable
reliability and value.
This narrowness of scope is a discernable feature of the modern
Canadian confessions rule. That rule excludes many of the confessions
most likely to be false, but still leaves plenty of room to admit police-
induced false confessions. This conclusion is supported on several
grounds.
First, even as the Supreme Court grappled in Oickle with the
problem of false confessions arising out of psychological interrogation,
the Court was careful to preserve the freedom of interrogators to put
pressure on suspects to confess. During a police interrogation that lasted
many hours, Oickle made a series of confessions, acknowledging greater
and greater responsibility for a string of arsons. Interrogators repeatedly
told him that he had failed a polygraph test, that the polygraph machine
does not lie, and that they already knew he was guilty. Police offered
him psychological help and threatened to interrogate his fiancee.
Despite these and other forms of psychological pressure, a majority of
the Supreme Court ruled Oickle's confessions voluntary, 83 thereby
sanctioning police use of several pressure tactics that raise real reliability
concerns. Oickle suggests that even a combination of such tactics may
not render a confession involuntary, 84 and subsequent cases confirm that
confessions may be ruled voluntary even when police use a number of
troubling interrogation strategies."
Another reason to believe that the confessions rule lets in some false
confessions is that Oickle gives short shrift to the problem of implicit
83. Oickle, supra note 7 at para. 99.
84. See Don Stuart, "Oickle: The Supreme Court's Recipe for Coercive Interrogation"
(2001) 36 C.R. (5th) 188.
85. See e.g. R. v. Grouse, 2004 NSCA 108, 226 N.S.R. (2d) 321 (upholding a trial judge's
ruling that a confession was voluntary, even though it arose out of an aggressive, often
profane interrogation in which a lesser included offence with a lighter penalty was
discussed); and R. v. M.C, 2001 NSCA 64, 193 N.S.R. (2d) 183 (upholding a finding of
voluntariness in the face of a number of borderline inducements, including suggestions that
the suspect might be held responsible for other offences under investigation and a promise
that the interrogator would make a telephone call to inquire about having the suspect
remanded to a youth facility so he could avoid spending the night in the police cells).
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inducements. While the Court affirmed the principle that even implied
threats and promises can render a confession involuntary, it seemed
blind to the implied inducements offered by the police in Oickle's case.
After Oickle confessed to setting one fire, an interrogator made several
confusing statements to him to the effect that the various fires that he
was accused of setting constituted a "bundle."86 While a majority of the
Supreme Court interpreted these statements as references to the police
theory that all the fires were set by the same arsonist, it seems clear that
the interrogator probably intended them (and Oickle probably
understood them) as implied promises that there would be little
difference in penal consequences between confessing to one fire or all
the fires.87 Oickle suggests that police can evade the confessions rule by
speaking in sentence fragments and non-sequiturs suggestive enough to
make suspects believe they have something to gain by confessing, but
ambiguous enough that the courts will not be able to find a crystallized
threat or promise.88
If there was any doubt after Oickle that the confessions rule offers
only modest protection to the accused, that doubt has been put to rest
in R. v. Spencer.8" In that case, police offered the accused a clear
inducement to confess: they refused to allow him to visit his girlfriend
until after he confessed his involvement in several robberies.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the statements were
voluntary. According to the majority, a confession may be voluntary
even if the police hold out an inducement in the form of a quid pro quo
for confessing. The key consideration in the voluntariness inquiry is
"the strength of the inducement, having regard to the particular
individual and his or her circumstances."90 Spencer highlights the
nebulous character of the voluntariness standard, which seems to defy
86. Transcript of interrogation quoted in Oickle, supra note 7 at paras. 129-30, Arbour
J., dissenting.
87. See ibid. at para. 131, ArbourJ., dissenting.
88. See Stuart, supra note 84 at 193 (criticizing the Supreme Court for condoning
interrogators' use of "deliberately ambiguous remarks about going after friends and relatives").
89. 2007 SCC 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500 [Spencer].
90. Ibid. at para. 15.
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any attempt at analytical rigour. Some police pressure is permitted, but
not too much.
It is therefore to be expected that some police-induced false
confessions enter into evidence despite the confessions rule. The rule
excludes self-incriminatory statements made under clearly coercive
circumstances because those are the confessions most likely to be false;
however, it operates to admit confessions where the police coercion is
less extreme. Given the wide latitude afforded interrogators under the
voluntariness rule, claims by the defence that a voluntary confession is
false should not be dismissed out of hand,91 but should be given fair
consideration by the jury.
Unfortunately, juries remain ill-equipped to evaluate such claims,
and Canadian law offers no guidance. It treats the confessions rule as the
exclusive solution to the false confessions problem and provides no way
of controlling the use of unreliable confessions that may come before
the jury despite the rule. When a confession has been admitted, there is
no way to educate jurors about the nature or the causes or even the
existence of false confessions. Juries cannot escape the duty to evaluate
the reliability of confessions,92 but they are left to assess the evidence on
the basis of their common sense. The natural tendency to doubt that an
innocent suspect would confess falsely raises a grave danger that juries
will credit any statement that is admitted as voluntary under the
confessions rule.
In sum, since the loss of relevant information places such heavy
burdens on the trial system, exclusionary rules tend to be narrow
enough to admit evidence in borderline cases. Thus, where an
exclusionary rule is the only safeguard, unreliable evidence can be
expected to find its way before juries who remain unprepared to assess
its value.
91. See e.g. Trotter, supra note 10 at 181, 187; and Martin, supra note 23 at para. 2.
92. See Trotter, ibid. at 200, 210.
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B. Educating the Jury
As an alternative to exclusionary rules, jurors can be educated about
the weaknesses of potentially unreliable evidence but left free to weigh it
for themselves.93 Such educational efforts should not only increase
jurors' scepticism about the prosecution's evidence but should also,
ideally, give them the analytical tools needed to assess it realistically. In
contrast to exclusionary rules, which assume but do not try to correct
certain deficiencies in jurors' understandings of prosecution evidence,
educating rules aim to remedy those deficiencies by bringing jurors'
views of the evidence more into line with educated views.
Of course, jurors can be educated to some extent by adversary
argument and cross-examination, the tools through which defence
counsel attack the reliability of prosecution evidence and point to
frailties in the Crown's case. However, these tools have limited
educative potential because they do not allow counsel to put forward
facts or general propositions about the psychology and reliability of
evidence. If juries are to learn about the track record of jailhouse
informants as a class of witnesses or to hear what social science has
revealed about the factors that make eyewitness evidence or confessions
unreliable, that education must come not from adversary lawyers but
from judges or expert witnesses. Skillful cross-examination and
argument may reveal the case-specific circumstances that make
testimony unreliable, but they are not enough to equip juries to grasp
the significance of those circumstances.94  Beyond the ordinary
adversarial devices of cross-examination and argument, there are two
ways of educating the jury about the frailties of unreliable evidence:
judicial instructions and expert evidence. This section reviews the
strengths and weaknesses of this educative approach.
93. See Galligan, supra note 71 at 256.
94. See e.g. Loftus & Doyle, supra note 12 at 274-75.
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(i) Strengths
The principal advantage of educating rules lies in the light burden
they impose on the trial process. Whereas exclusionary rules are costly,
both in terms of court resources and amount of relevant information,
jurors can be sensitized to the frailties of unreliable prosecution evidence
at little cost in either of those respects. Moreover, because the burdens
of education are relatively light, jurors can receive some education in a
wide range of cases. Educating rules provide some protection against
wrongful convictions while interfering only minimally with the process
of jury adjudication.
a. Cost
While limiting rules take a heavy toll on the trial process in terms of
lost information, educating rules increase the relevant information
available to juries. They permit the prosecution's potentially unreliable
evidence to go before the jury alongside some contextual information
thought to assist the jury in interpreting that evidence. Quite simply,
educating rules carry no costs in the form of lost evidence.
The story with respect to courtroom resources is more mixed; here,
much depends on the source of the education. Cautionary jury
instructions on the frailties of certain types of evidence require only a
few minutes of court time.95 These instructions can be, and usually are,
largely standardized, so judges need not expend much effort framing
unique instructions in every case. By contrast, expert evidence requires a
substantial investment of courtroom resources. Direct and cross-
examination of a defence expert can take a long time, and there is always
the possibility that the prosecution will call an expert of its own.
Moreover, experts must be sought out, prepared for trial, and paid for
their time, normally by the parties themselves.
95. See Steven E. Holtshouser, "Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for
Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases" (1983) 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1387 at 1423
(arguing in favour of cautionary eyewitness jury instructions because they protect the
innocent at little cost to society).
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b. Scope of Protection
As noted above, evidentiary exclusion imposes heavy burdens on the
trial system, so evidence is most likely to be excluded in the narrow
range of cases where doubts about its reliability are very grave. In
contrast, cautionary instructions can be incorporated into the trial
process at little cost, so one might expect such instructions to be offered
in a wider range of cases, and perhaps even in all cases where the
prosecution relies on a particular species of evidence. Indeed, an
instruction on the frailties of eyewitness evidence is mandatory in
Canadian criminal trials whenever the defence claims mistaken identity.
Similarly, in the context of unsavoury witnesses like jailhouse
informants, the Supreme Court has held that a trial judge may be
required to offer a Vetrovec warning even when the defence does not
request one.96 Cautionary jury instructions are well suited for wide use
in cases where the reliability of the prosecution's evidence is in doubt.
They are an inexpensive means of sensitizing the jury to the frailties of
the evidence.
In comparison, expert evidence could at best protect the innocent
from conviction in a much narrower range of cases. Formally, rules
permitting expert testimony could be quite broad. For example, existing
Canadian law prohibits experts from testifying about the general frailties
of eyewitness identification and, in most US jurisdictions, trial judges
are simply given the discretion to admit such testimony. One could
conceive of a blanket rule permitting the defence to call a psychological
expert whenever the case turns on eyewitness identification. But merely
permitting the defence to call an expert would not guarantee access to
expert services. Even if experts on eyewitness identification or false
confessions were permitted to testify, they would rarely take the stand
because most accused persons could not afford to hire them.97
To be sure, a few indigent accused have been able to retain experts at
the state's expense. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in 1985 that the
Constitution entitles some defendants to publicly-funded expert
96. Brooks, supra note 7 at paras. 84-92, 99-101.
97. See e.g. People v. Wright, 729 P.2d 280 at 294 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1987) [Wright].
L. Dufraimont
assistance.98 However, whether an expert must be provided is decided
on a case-by-case basis and it has never been made clear that this
constitutional right covers eyewitness experts.99 In Canada, a few cases
recognize an analogous right to state-funded expert assistance under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1° but this right is probably
very limited in scope. 10 Even the constitutional right to state-funded
counsel for indigent accused persons - of which the right to state-
funded expert assistance is only a poor relation 2 - has rarely been
discussed by Canadian courts and has never been specifically affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada." 3 The dearth of cases on the Charter
right to publicly-funded counsel reflects confidence that adequate
98. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
99. See Loftus & Doyle, supra note 12 at 282; and Fred Warren Bennett, "Toward
Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice: Providing Indigent Defendants with Expert
Services and an Adequate Defense" (1995) 58:1 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 95.
100. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
101. In each of the reported cases, the court recognized that indigent defendants hold a
qualified Charter right to state-funded expert assistance but declined to find that the right
had been violated in the circumstances of the particular case: R. v. Poslowsky, [1997] B.C.J.
No. 2124 (S.C.) (QL) [Poslowsky]; R. c. Chartrand, [2003] J.Q. 22217 (C.Q. crim & p6n.)
(QL) [Chartrand]; and R. v. J.J.B., 2002 BCPC 50 [J.JB.].
102. Like the constitutional right to state-funded trial defense counsel, the right to
publicly-funded expert assistance is understood as an element of fair trial rights under ss. 7
and 11(d) of the Charter, supra note 100; See Chartrand, ibid. at paras. 24-27; and
Poslowsky, ibid. at para. 5.
103. The Supreme Court has, however, recognized a qualified right to state-funded
counsel for indigent parents facing custody proceedings where legal representation is
needed to ensure that the hearing is fair: New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services) v. G. 6.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46. More generally, the Court recently
affirmed in British Columbia (A.G.) v. Christie, 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 at para. 27
that 'the text of the Constitution, the jurisprudence and the historical understanding of the
rule of law do not foreclose the possibility that a right to counsel may be recognized in
specific and varied situations." The leading case on the right to state-funded defense
counsel is R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) I at 66 (Ont. C.A.) [Rowbotham] ("[I]n
cases not falling within provincial legal aid plans, ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, which
guarantee an accused a fair trial in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice,
require funded counsel to be provided if the accused wishes counsel, but cannot pay a
lawyer, and representation of the accused is essential to a fair trial").
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representation is provided by legal aid organizations serving the public
in every part of Canada.1"4 This confidence probably extends to the
provision of defence experts, which can also be funded through these
programs.' 5 Obviously, however, not every request for a publicly-
funded expert will be granted, and many accused who might benefit
from an expert's assistance are likely to find that neither the rules of the
legal aid system nor the Charter guarantees them access to this service.
Quite apart from the cost of hiring an expert, there are not currently
enough qualified experts to make a dent in the mountain of eyewitness
and confessions cases that arise each year. Gary Wells has estimated that
fewer than 50 psychologists are qualified to testify as eyewitness experts
in the United States, while there are more than 77,000 eyewitness cases
every year. 10 6 There is little doubt that the number of experts available
to testify in Canadian trials is similarly inadequate. Of course, if
eyewitness expert testimony were more widely admissible, more
psychologists might come forth to fill the demand. At least for the
moment, however, expert evidence does not offer a systemic solution to
the danger of error raised by eyewitness mistake. °7 More broadly, any
rule permitting expert testimony on the frailties of unreliable
prosecution evidence seems likely to succeed in educating juries in only
a limited number of cases, but is destined to fail to reach the majority of
jurors confronted with these problematic forms of proof.
104. See Rowbotbam, ibid. at 66.
105. For example, regulations under Ontario's Legal Aid Services Act, 1998, S.O.
1998, c. 26 vest legal aid officials with discretion to fund defense experts. 0. Reg.
107/99, Sched. 6, s. 1.3. For detail about what expert expenses may be covered by
legal aid, see Legal Aid Ontario, TariffAnd Billing Handbook (2007) at 6-19, online:
< http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/info/pdf/Tariff-Manual.pdf >.
106. Gary L. Wells, "Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform"
Champion Magazine (April 2005) 12, online: <http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01/49blb19b6786ffc685256tbd006a4c9b?OpenDocument >
[Wells, "Science and Reform"].
107. See ibid.: "The cost of expert testimony, and the arbitrariness with which cases will
receive this benefit, make this solution ineffective given the magnitude of the problem."
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(ii) Weaknesses
The principal disadvantage of educating rules is that one cannot be sure
how well they protect the innocent. Attempts to educate juries about
unreliable forms of proof succeed only if they sensitize juries to the
frailties of the evidence. Sensitivity is heightened when juries receive full
and accurate information about those frailties in a way that improves their
ability to assess the evidence."' Unfortunately, cautionary instructions
and expert evidence sometimes fail to convey the necessary information,
or convey it in a way that fails to assist the jury.
a. Quality of the Message
Educating rules are premised on the notion that certain factors
bearing on the reliability of prosecution evidence are unknown, if not
counterintuitive, to the average juror. Jury instructions and expert
evidence can improve jurors' sensitivity to these factors by identifying
them and explaining how they affect the reliability of the evidence.
These educational efforts aim to provide juries with general propositions
drawn from psychological research and judicial experience that can be
used as analytical tools to assess testimonial reliability. Their success
depends on the correctness and completeness of the factual propositions
they contain.
There are two main concerns about the accuracy of the information
given by expert witnesses. First, especially in the area of false
confessions, courts worry that the science has not developed to the
point where experts can be confident about their claims." 9 Second, there
is a concern that partisan affiliation may cause expert witnesses to skew
108. Cutler & Penrod, supra note 12 at 217 ('We use sensitivity to refer to both
knowledge of how a given factor influences eyewitness memory and the ability to render
decisions in accordance with that knowledge. Thus, sensitivity contains two components:
knowledge and integration").
109. E.g. People v. Philips, 692 N.Y.S. 2d 915 at 919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); and Warren,
supra note 47. See also McIntosh, supra note 24 at 102-04 (questioning the scientific status
of a psychologist's proposed testimony on eyewitness identification).
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their presentation in favour of the defence.11 ° Nevertheless, if we are to
educate the jury about the problems of eyewitness memory or false
confessions, psychologists working in those areas are in the best position
to explain the state of knowledge.
Graver doubts surround the quality of the educational message of
jury instructions. The contents of an eyewitness jury instruction, for
example, vary considerably between jurisdictions, and in some forms
the instruction is so watered down that it can only be described as a
palpably deficient mechanism for sensitizing jurors to the frailties of
eyewitness testimony. Several different versions of the American
eyewitness jury instruction are catalogued in the literature.1 ' The most
rudimentary, known as the "burden of proof" eyewitness jury
instruction, simply reminds the jury that the prosecutor must prove the
perpetrator's identity beyond a reasonable doubt."2 This instruction has
very limited educational value because it fails to identify, let alone
explain, the factors bearing on the reliability of eyewitness
identification. 113
Another kind of eyewitness instruction, the most widely used in US
state and federal jurisdictions, is the "factors" or "Telfaire" instruction," 4
so named after the 1972 appeal court decision in which it was first
110. See e.g. Loftus & Doyle, supra note 12 at 329. Of course, this criticism applies only
to experts called to testify on behalf of the parties. Expert knowledge could come before
the courts in other ways, for example by courts appointing independent eyewitness or
false confessions experts. This possibility seems promising because court-appointed
experts could provide an unbiased explanation of the psychological principles at stake.
See e.g. Peter J. Cohen, "How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification" (1996) 16 Pace L. Rev. 237 (advocating the
use of court-appointed experts on eyewitness identification, who would provide useful
information on eyewitness psychology in the form of neutral testimony not slanted by
adversary excess). However, because they represent the norm in both Canada and the US,
this analysis focuses on partisan experts and leaves a thorough consideration of court-
appointed experts to another day.
111. Loftus & Doyle, ibid. at 333-38.
112. Ibid. at 333.
113. Ibid. (describing such instructions as "close to useless").
114. Ibid. at 333-34.
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proposed.115 The Telfaire instruction highlights a number of the
psychological factors affecting eyewitness reliability but stops short of
explaining their effects: it emphasizes that the prosecutor must prove
identity, and it admonishes the jury to consider the eyewitness'
opportunity to observe the perpetrator, the possibility that the
identification was influenced by police identification procedures, and
other general issues.116 Because the Telfaire instruction focuses attention
on some of the factors known to affect eyewitness memory and
testimony, it has some potential to sensitize jurors to the frailties of the
evidence. But it contains little psychological information. Because it fails
to explain how the relevant factors bear on eyewitness reliability, it can
hardly be expected to teach jurors much about eyewitness testimony,
much less to challenge any misapprehensions they may hold."7
A final version of the eyewitness jury instruction, labeled the "expert
substitute" instruction, holds more promise from the point of view of
the fullness and accuracy of the information conveyed."' This kind of
instruction aims to do just what an expert witness would do: identify
and explain the psychological factors that affect eyewitness reliability. In
the 1987 case of Wright, the California Supreme Court held that the trial
judge had committed reversible error by failing to offer instructions that
would both caution the jury on the potential unreliability of eyewitness
testimony and review the factors bearing on the weight of the
identification evidence. 119 The court proposed a model instruction that
not only identified those factors but also briefly outlined how they
worked. The instruction included a number of cautions grounded in
psychological research, including these: "people are better at identifying
persons they already know than persons with whom they have had no
previous contact"; "[s]tudies show that when the witness and the person
he is identifying are of different races, and particularly when the witness
is white and the offender is black, the identification tends to be less
115. Telfaire, supra note 17.
116. Ibid. at 558-59.
117. See e.g. Cutler & Penrod, supra note 12 at 256; and Loftus & Doyle, supra note 12 at 334.
118. Loftus & Doyle, ibid. at 337.
119. See Wright, supra note 97.
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reliable than if both persons are of the same race"; and "studies show
that a witness may subconsciously incorporate into his memory
information from other sources, such as descriptions by other
witnesses."'
20
This proposed expert substitute instruction was short-lived, as
People v. Wright was reversed on rehearing. 121 Indeed, probably because
they constitute a kind of judicial comment on the evidence that is
disapproved or prohibited in most US jurisdictions, 122 expert substitute
instructions are rarely offered in American courts. Still, their strengths
have occasionally been recognized. 123 Expert substitute instructions are
the only eyewitness jury instructions that contain enough psychological
information to challenge misguided views on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony.
Reasonable doubt, Telfaire and expert substitute eyewitness
instructions fall along a spectrum from weak to strong in the depth of
psychological information they contain and in the force of their
cautionary message. Interestingly, Canadian eyewitness jury instructions
lie farther toward the stronger end of that spectrum than any
instruction permitted by American courts. The Canadian instruction
amounts to an unusually detailed expert substitute instruction, covering
(where appropriate) such matters as the weak relationship between
eyewitness confidence and accuracy, the risk of mistakenly identifying
as the perpetrator one whose face is familiar from another context, and
the low value of in-court identifications. 124 Moreover, whereas American
trial judges normally must keep their comments balanced and refrain
from pointing out the frailties of particular eyewitnesses' testimony, 125
120. Ibid. at 296-97.
121. 45 Cal. 3d 1126 (Cal. 1988) (endorsing a Telfaireinstruction), rev'g Wigb4 supra note 97.
122. Loftus & Doyle, supra note 12 at 337-38.
123. Cases approving the use of such instructions include e.g. State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d
953 at 961 (Utah Sup. Ct. 2002) [Hubbard]; and United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525
(E.D.N.Y.1996).
124. See e.g. Hibbert, supra note 7.
125. See e.g. Wrigbt, supra note 97 at 287-88 (at once proposing an expert substitute
instruction and stressing that the trial court should neither highlight the frailties of the
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Canadian trial courts are required to instruct the jury in unabashedly
non-neutral terms12 6 and to relate that eyewitness instruction to the facts
of the case.127 The Canadian eyewitness jury instruction is remarkable
for its sharply cautionary tone and for the fullness of the information it
contains.
The same holds true of the Vetrovec warning normally offered on
the testimony of jailhouse informants and other unsavoury prosecution
witnesses. That "clear and sharp" warning alerts the jury to the danger
that the unsavoury witness' testimony may be unreliable, it explains any
special reasons to suspect the witness' veracity (benefits sought in
exchange for testimony, or a history of perjury, for example) and warns
the jury that it would be unsafe to rely on that evidence alone.128
Vetrovec warnings reflect judicial experience with jailhouse informants
who have often testified falsely against others in the hope of obtaining
some benefit from the authorities. Like eyewitness instructions, they are
designed to give juries the benefit of an informed perspective on
unreliable prosecution evidence.
To assess realistically the value of these problematic forms of proof,
juries need to grasp certain insights from psychology and from forensic
experience. Although Canadian courts appear to be adept at framing
cautionary instructions that incorporate those insights, some important
gaps persist. For example, current published versions of the eyewitness
jury instruction fail to discuss the possibility, long recognized by
psychologists, that the natural tendency to focus on a perpetrator's
weapon may detract from the witness' opportunity to observe and
particular identification on the facts of the case nor deliver comments on the evidence
that are slanted in favor of the defense).
126. For example, a standard instruction opens with the observation that when the
innocent are convicted, eyewitness mistake is often to blame. See Hibbert, supra note 7 at
para. 79; and Ferguson, Dambrot & Bennett, supra note 22 at s.4.55.
127. Canning, supra note 19.
128. Vetrovec, supra note 59 at 831; and Accord Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 at 784 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2000) (laying out a model cautionary instruction that is mandatory whenever
a jailhouse informant testifies).
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remember the perpetrator's face.129 Similarly, the standard Vetrovec
caution fails to warn juries that dishonest jailhouse informants are often
able to gather from other sources information that would seem to be
available only to the perpetrator. 3 ° These omissions are important and
need to be corrected. Nevertheless, like expert evidence, jury
instructions have the potential to convey the information a jury needs
to assess the value of unreliable evidence.
b. Impact on the Jury
To protect the innocent effectively, attempts to educate the jury
through instructions or expert evidence must do more than convey the
necessary information. They must convey the information in a way that
the jury can understand it and use it. Because it is difficult to gauge how
well juries grasp and make use of the information they receive,
educating rules suffer from a serious weakness: we cannot be sure what
impact they have. Expert evidence and cautionary instructions may
equip jurors to assess unreliable forms of proof, but they may just as
well be ignored, misunderstood or even given undue weight.
The impact of an attempt to educate the jury about the frailties of
prosecution evidence depends on a number of variables. The content
and language of the communication probably affects whether the jury
accepts and acts on the information, as the jury could easily become
confused by too much information or by abstruse language. In addition,
the influence information has on the jury may depend on its source,
which might be the trial judge or a defence expert. Finally, the timing of
the communication could affect its impact. Experimental psychologists
have conducted research, discussed below, on the impact of expert
evidence and jury instructions in the area of eyewitness testimony. But
few solid conclusions can be drawn from the existing studies, and
ultimately little is known about whether and how juries can be
129. See e.g. Ferguson, Dambrot & Bennett, supra note 22 at s.4.55 (presenting a
boilerplate instruction that omits this issue); and Copeland, supra note 23 at 202-03
(noting this and other lacunae in the standard instruction).
130. See Sophonow Inquiry Report, supra note 4 at 74.
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effectively educated on the frailties of potentially unreliable prosecution
evidence.
The uncertainty surrounding this issue is manifested in our
incomplete understanding of how the timing of expert evidence and
jury instructions affects their impact. Where permitted, expert evidence
critiquing the reliability of the prosecution's evidence is admitted as part
of the defence case, often long after the prosecution's witnesses have
finished testifying. And while judges have some discretion in the timing
and form of jury instructions, most often cautionary instructions are
offered as a part of the judge's final charge to the jury.' Commentators
frequently claim that whether it takes the form of expert evidence or a
cautionary instruction, the education comes too late.' 32 By the time
jurors receive a cautionary message, they have already accepted the
evidence in question and incorporated it into a mental "story" of the
crime event - a story that, once constructed, is resistant to change. 33
The claim that cautionary instructions and defence experts would have
more influence on the jury if offered earlier in the trial seems plausible,
since jury research has shown that the timing and order of trial elements
131. See e.g. R. v. Mnard, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 109 at para. 27 (admitting that "long and
detailed instructions at the end of a trial may be more confusing than helpful" and
holding that the timing and form of the jury charge lie within the discretion of the judge);
and Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 634 ("The content and timing of the
[Vetrovec] caution is within the trial judge's discretion. Indeed,... in 34 percent of the 41
cases where a warning was given, it was given both when the evidence was called and in
the charge to the jury").
132. See e.g. Leippe, "Eyewitness Memory", supra note 23 at 944 (suggesting that
eyewitness expert evidence that comes before the eyewitness testimony is "worth
studying"); Cohen, supra note 110 at 272-73 (expressing doubt that an instruction at the
end of a long trial can affect the jury's view of eyewitness identification evidence).
133. This claim is based on the "story model" of juror decision-making, a psychological
theory positing that jurors decide cases by organizing all the evidence into a story about
what happened. See e.g. Robert K. Bothwell, "Social Cognition in the Courtroom: Juror
Information Processing and Story Construction" in Walter F. Abbott & John Batt, eds.,
A Handbook ofJury Research (Philadelphia, PA: American Law Institute - American Bar
Association, 1999) at 17-1.
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can change their effects.1"4 Yet no one can be sure how this factor
works; evidence and instructions offered early in the proceedings may
be more apt to influence jurors' initial belief formation, but information
offered late in the trial has an "advantage of recency" in the sense that it
may be fresher in jurors' minds as they move into deliberations.135
These conflicting considerations preclude any firm conclusions about
the optimal time to educate juries. As the content, language and source
of the educational message can also vary, it would be dangerous to
generalize about the effectiveness of educating rules.
Certain insights can be gained from the studies that have been
conducted on the effect of expert testimony in the eyewitness context.
Early research suggested that expert testimony reduces jurors' level of
belief in eyewitness testimony,"' a result that has frequently been
replicated.'37 But the early studies did not clarify whether the expert
testimony made jurors more sensitive to the factors that make
eyewitness identification unreliable or simply caused them to be more
sceptical of eyewitnesses in general.138 To confront that question, Brian
Cutler, Steven Penrod and Hedy Dexter designed a set of experiments
to isolate the sensitivity and scepticism effects of expert testimony.
1 39
They reasoned that, ideally, expert evidence should not reduce jurors'
overall belief in eyewitness testimony, but should cause them to
discriminate more effectively between relatively reliable identifications
134. See e.g. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, "What Social Science Teaches Us
About the Jury Instruction Process" (1997) 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 589 at 628-32.
135. Michael R. Leippe et aL, "Timing of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, Jurors' Need
for Cognition, and Case Strength as Determinants of Trial Verdicts" (2004) 89 Journal of
Applied Psychology 524 at 526 (reporting a recent study conducted with college students
reading trial transcripts, finding that eyewitness expert evidence offered before the
eyewitness testimony had no effect on juror verdicts, while expert testimony given later
in the proceedings did influence verdicts).
136. E.g. Harmon M. Hosch, 'A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of
Expert Testimony on Jurors" (1980) 4 Law & Human Behavior 297 at 299.
137. See e.g. Cutler & Penrod, supra note 12 at 223; Leippe, "Eyewitness Memory", supra
note 23 at 940.
138. Cutler & Penrod, ibid. at 218-23.
139. Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Hedy R. Dexter, "The Eyewitness, the Expert
Psychologist, and the Jury" (1989) 13 Law and Human Behavior 311.
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made in favourable circumstances and relatively unreliable
identifications made in unfavourable conditions. Cutler, Penrod and
Dexter therefore looked for an interaction between the presence or
absence of expert evidence and the quality of the "[w]itnessing and
identification conditions." 4 . And they found one: their experiments
indicated that hearing expert evidence did not make mock jurors
sceptical of all eyewitness testimony. As compared to the mock jurors
who did not hear the eyewitness expert, mock jurors who did hear the
expert evidence viewed the prosecution's case as being weaker when the
perpetrator was disguised and armed, when the lineup procedures were
suggestive, and when the interval between the crime and the
identification was long. However, they saw the prosecution's case as
being stronger when these conditions were reversed and were therefore
more favourable to an accurate identification. Cutler and Penrod
conclude that these experimental findings demonstrate that "expert
testimony sensitizes jurors", 41 to the factors that make eyewitness
identification unreliable and "provide support for the use of expert
psychological testimony in eyewitness cases. ""'
This conclusion requires some qualification. Cutler, Penrod and
Dexter's experiments are alone in demonstrating a sensitization effect,
143
and other recent research suggests that expert testimony fails to sensitize
jurors to the suggestiveness of lineup procedures.'44 Moreover, the fact
that the eyewitness expert testimony produced no general scepticism
does not necessarily represent a desirable result. Many of the findings of
psychological experts - for example, that eyewitnesses have been
known to make honest mistakes with high levels of confidence -
should lead jurors to hesitate before accepting any eyewitness
140. Cutler & Penrod, supra note 12 at 225.
141. Ibid. at 229.
142. Ibid. at 240.
143. Leippe, "Eyewitness Memory", supra note 23 at 923-24 (calling this showing of
sensitivity without scepticism "less than robust").
144. See Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, 'Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations" (1997) 3 Psychol. Pub.
Pol'y & L. 338 at 356-57.
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identification.'45 The very reason why the defence calls these experts is
to warn jurors against too readily accepting eyewitness identification
testimony. Some general scepticism toward this category of proof is a
natural and indeed desirable consequence of this kind of expert
testimony."'
These qualifications notwithstanding, the research on eyewitness
expert testimony grounds a few important conclusions. There is little
doubt that expert testimony affects jurors' views of eyewitness
identification evidence and makes them somewhat more reluctant to
convict on that basis. The research also provides some support for the
view that, instead of simply instilling scepticism, expert testimony
improves jurors' abilities to assess the reliability of identification
evidence. More broadly, the studies have shown that attitudes about
unreliable prosecution evidence are malleable. Jurors can learn during
the trial to treat a particular form of evidence with more caution than
they might at first have thought necessary. In short, efforts to educate
the jury can succeed, at least to a degree.
The existing literature on jury instructions is less encouraging.
Indeed, a level of scholarly consensus has developed around the notion
that jury instructions on eyewitness identification are basically
ineffective.' 47 This notion finds superficial support in an impressive
145. Leippe, "Eyewitness Memory", supra note 23 at 942.
146. Ibid. at 941-42 (discussing the interrelationship between scepticism and sensitivity
to eyewitness factors); but see Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, supra note 139 at 314 (suggesting
that more must be learned about jurors' pre-existing levels of belief in eyewitness
identification evidence before it will be possible to determine whether enhancing their
scepticism is a good thing).
147. See e.g. Cutler & Penrod, supra note 12 at 264 ("On the whole we are forced to
conclude that the judges' instructions do not serve as an effective safeguard against
mistaken identifications and convictions. . ."); Wise, Dauphinais & Safer, supra note 23 at
830-33; Jacqueline McMurtrie, "The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful
Convictions" (2005) 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1271 at 1276 ("Research over the past thirty
years has shown that expert testimony on memory and eyewitness identification is the
only legal safeguard that is effective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness errors" [footnote
omitted]); and Handberg, supra note 23 at 1062. But see Wells, "Science and Reform",
supra note 106 at 12 ("[J]udges should consider motions for instructions to juries that
warn them against placing too much weight on eyewitness identification evidence");
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body of research indicating that judicial instructions to the jury are very
often ineffective and poorly understood.148 However, this literature
focuses primarily on legal instructions, on disregard instructions and on
limiting instructions.149 One can hardly be surprised that jurors have
trouble grasping complex and esoteric legal rules or concepts when they
are explained briefly, orally and in impenetrable language) 5 Nor should
Holtshouser, supra note 95 at 1426 (favouring Telfaire instructions as a safeguard against
wrongful convictions based on mistaken identification); and Michael H. Hoffheimer,
"Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal
Trials" (1989) 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 585 (arguing that US federal circuit courts
should mandate cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification).
148. For a review, see Lieberman & Sales, supra note 134.
149. See e.g. Valerie P. Hans & Andrea J. Appel, "The Jury on Trial" in Abbott & Batt,
supra note 133, 3-1 at 3-11 (noting that a wealth of research indicates that jurors have
trouble comprehending and applying legal instructions from the judge); Liberman & Sales,
ibid. at 598-99 (reviewing a large body of research indicating that despite - or because of -
judicial instructions, jurors' understandings of the concept of reasonable doubt are
inconsistent); and Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, "Understanding the Limits of Limiting
Instructions: Some Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard
Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence" (2000) 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 677
(reviewing research indicating that both limiting and disregarded instructions have been
shown to be unsuccessful in controlling jury decision-making).
150. One key difficulty with legal instructions is that the need to state the law correctly
often leads courts to use language that jurors find difficult to understand. Lieberman &
Sales, supra note 134; and Franklin D. Strier, Reconstructing Justice (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1996). Two recent Canadian studies confirm that jurors
have trouble understanding and following legal instructions. In the first, Canadian
undergraduates, law students and citizens summoned to jury duty were exposed to a legal
instruction on the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule and asked to apply it to a
given set of facts, either alone or working in groups. All groups and individuals
performed poorly on the application tests, indicating that jurors cannot understand and
apply these instructions. V. Gordon Rose & James R. P. Ogloff, "Evaluating the
Comprehensibility of Jury Instructions: A Method and an Example" (2001) 25 Law and
Human Behavior 409 at 410. The second study required jury-eligible volunteers to watch
a lengthy video trial simulation and deliberate as juries before individually filling out
questionnaires. Asked to recall the elements of first degree murder and manslaughter and
to explain the concept of reasonable doubt, many participants admitted that they could
not remember these legal concepts or simply produced garbled language apparently lifted
from American courtroom dramas. One participant referred to "murder without
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anyone be shocked to learn that jurors often fail to cleanse their minds
of evidence that they have seen or heard but that is technically
inadmissible or admissible only for limited purposes.151 In themselves,
these facts say nothing about the effectiveness of instructions
commenting on the weight and reliability of evidence.'
The only way to determine whether cautionary instructions work is
to examine their effects specifically. Thus, the claim that eyewitness jury
instructions are ineffective is primarily based on the few existing studies
that have examined their use. These studies vary in their findings, but
they coalesce around the conclusion that eyewitness jury instructions
either cause jurors to be somewhat more sceptical of eyewitnesses
generally or that such instruction have no effect.
A leading early study is that of Edith Greene, which aimed to
measure the effects of the Telfaire instruction and a modified version of
the factors instruction that Greene herself had drafted. 5 ' Her
instruction used language and an organizational structure intended to be
more comprehensible than the Telfaire instruction, and also identified a
few psychological factors not mentioned in the Telfaire instruction.
After viewing videotaped mock trials that included either no eyewitness
instruction, the Telfaire instruction or Greene's instruction, mock jurors
were asked to deliberate in groups and individually fill out
questionnaires giving their verdicts. In terms of pre-deliberation
verdicts, 45% of mock jurors who had heard no instruction voted to
aforethought," even though the notion of "malice aforethought" is foreign to Canadian
law. V. Gordon Rose, Social Cognition and Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act: Can
Jurors "Properly" Use Criminal Record Evidence? (Ph.D. dissertation, Simon Fraser
University, 2003) at 47-48 [unpublished].
151. For one recent study confirming that Canadian jurors have difficulty understanding
and following limiting instructions, see Rose, ibid. at 47-48 ("Comprehension levels were
very poor ... specifically for the [limiting] instructions regarding the use of criminal
record evidence").
152. See Lieberman & Sales, supra note 134 at 593 (reviewing research findings on juror
comprehension of various types of jury instructions, and finding that comprehension
varies depending on the type of instruction).
153. Edith Greene, "Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and
Revision" (1988) 18 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 252.
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convict, while individuals who had heard the Telfaire instruction and
Greene's own instruction voted to convict 53% and 23% of the time.'54
Greene had hoped to demonstrate that her own instruction would
improve juries' sensitivity to eyewitness factors, and she varied the
strength of the witnessing conditions such that the eyewitness had either
a good or a relatively poor opportunity to view the perpetrator.55 In the
result, however, no sensitivity effect could be shown: the prosecution's
case in the mock scenarios was so weak that, post-deliberation, few
groups voted to convict in any condition, and none did so where the
witnessing conditions were poor.
156
Another early study by Richard Katzev and Scott Wishart examined
the effects of eyewitness jury instructions.15 z In this study, the judge
offered mock jurors one of three alternative sets of instructions:
instructions on the law alone; instructions on the law and a review of
the evidence; or both of these, plus a commentary on the frailties of
eyewitness identification. Mock jurors' propensity to offer pre-
deliberation guilty verdicts varied inversely with the extensiveness of the
instructions they were offered. Thus, Katzev and Wishart concluded
that jury instructions on eyewitness identification reduced jurors' belief
in eyewitness testimony. Unfortunately, as in Greene's study, Katzev
and Wishart's stimulus materials involved a very weak prosecution case.
No mock jury returned a post-deliberation guilty verdict, and no
sensitivity effect could be shown.
Most recently, Gabriella Ramirez, Dennis Zemba and R. Edward
Geiselman conducted two mock juror experiments examining the effects
of Telfaire instruction and of an expert-substitute instruction drafted by
154. Ibid. at 265.
155. Ibid. at 256.
156. Ibid. at 265-66 (reporting that, of 24 juries, 2 voted to convict, 12 voted to acquit
and 10 were hung).
157. Richard D. Katzev & Scott S. Wishart, "The Impact of Judicial Commentary
Concerning Eyewitness Identifications on Jury Decision Making" (1985) 76 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 733.
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the authors.158 They found that the Telfaire instruction reduced mock
jurors' sensitivity to the quality of the eyewitness evidence. 59 The
expert-substitute instruction did not have this sensitivity-reducing effect,
but neither was it shown to increase sensitivity. 60 Once again, however,
the weakness of the case against the accused was a complicating factor.
The authors acknowledged a possibility that the expert-substitute
instructions might have increased sensitivity had the evidence been less
favourable to the accused.161 In any event, the authors viewed the expert-
substitute instruction as a "promising alternative" because it had an
educative effect: 162 subjects who heard it were better able to answer
questions about eyewitness factors than those who heard no instructions
or the Telfaire instruction.163
Finally, a 1990 study by Cutler, Dexter and Penrod also failed to
show that the Telfare instruction promotes sensitivity. The experiment
was designed to test whether the Telfaire instruction would have the
same sensitizing effect the authors observed in their earlier study of
eyewitness expert evidence.164 They found that incorporating a Telfaire
instruction into the videotaped mock trial had no impact on jurors, and
they concluded that the instruction was ineffective. 1
65
Taken together, these studies support a general conclusion that the
impact of eyewitness jury instructions depends on the form and
contents of the instruction. For example, Greene's modifications to the
Telfaire instruction were relatively minor, but they produced markedly
different results. Before deliberating, jurors who heard the standard
158. Gabriella Ramirez, Dennis Zemba & R. Edward Geiselman, "Judges' Cautionary
Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony" (1996) 14:1 American Journal of Forensic
Psychology 31.
159. Ibid. at 41.
160. Ibid. at 57.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid. at 58.
163. Ibid. at 56-58.
164. Brian L. Cutler, Hedy R. Dexter & Steven D. Penrod, "Nonadversarial Methods
for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence" (1990) 20 Journal of Applied Social
Psychology 1197.
165. Ibid. at 1205.
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Telfaire instruction were actually more likely to convict than those who
heard no eyewitness instruction, while jurors who heard Greene's
instruction were less likely to convict than jurors in either of the other
two groups. The Katzev and Wishart study and the Ramirez, Zemba
and Geiselman experiments also support the conclusion that the effect
of instructions depends on their form and content. In both of these
studies, different versions of the instructions had varying effects on
juror scepticism and sensitivity toward eyewitness evidence.
Significantly, the existing studies on eyewitness jury instructions
have failed to demonstrate that eyewitness jury instructions sensitize
jurors to the factors affecting eyewitness reliability. This has led many
commentators to conclude that such instructions are essentially
ineffective. 166 However, this general conclusion is premature. The
existing studies are few in number, are plagued with methodological
problems and focus predominantly on the Telfaire instruction, which
lacks the kind of informational content necessary to educate jurors
about the frailties of eyewitness identification. To conclude broadly that
jury instructions are ineffective implies that the source of the message
(the judge) and not its contents make it ineffective. However, while the
source of the message probably does affect its impact, 67 its content
seems to be at least as important. Claims by American jurists and social
scientists that eyewitness jury instructions do not work are jurisdiction-
specific: they refer primarily to Telfaire instructions. The Canadian
eyewitness jury instruction is more detailed and sharply cautionary. Its
impact has never been empirically studied and it might very well differ
from that of the more skeletal Telfaire instruction. 168
166. For more on this topic see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
167. Two existing studies, reported in Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, supra note 164, indicate
that the source of information about eyewitness testimony can affect its impact on the
jury. The first examined the impact of psychological evidence from a court-appointed
eyewitness expert, while the second investigated the use of opposing eyewitness experts.
Both the court-appointed and opposing experts appeared to promote scepticism but not
sensitivity among jurors, whereas an earlier study indicated that defense eyewitness
expert testimony generated sensitivity but not scepticism.
168. Thus, American research on the effectiveness of eyewitness jury instructions is of
limited help in determining the effectiveness of the Canadian instructions. See
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In sum, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the impact of
expert evidence and jury instructions on eyewitness identification, but
their efforts yield few safe conclusions about the effectiveness of these
educational efforts even within the eyewitness context, let alone more
broadly with respect to unreliable prosecution evidence. It appears that
both expert evidence and cautionary jury instructions can affect
verdicts, and that their effects depend on what the jury is told, how and
by whom.169 Exactly how such education affects jurors remains
unknown, and it is not even clear what an optimal effect would be.17°
Jurors, we hope, do not simply ignore expert evidence and jury
instructions, but neither would it be desirable for their judgment to be
Christopher Sherrin, "Comment on the Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages of
Justice" (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 140 at 150. Yet, some Canadian commentators have fallen
into the trap of assuming that American research casting doubt on the effectiveness of
Telfaire instructions proves Canadian instructions ineffective. See Copeland, supra note 23
at 202, 207 (citing Cutler & Penrod, supra note 12 for the proposition that jury
instructions on eyewitness identification evidence constitute an ineffective safeguard
against wrongful convictions); Trotter, supra note 10 at 193 (relying on Copeland, supra
note 23 on this point).
169. Additional support for these general conclusions can be drawn from studies on the
effects of jury instructions on confession evidence. Certain US jurisdictions follow the
"Massachusetts rule" for confession evidence, which requires that juries be instructed to
determine whether a confession was offered voluntarily and to disregard the evidence if
they find that it was given involuntarily. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman,
"Confession Evidence" in Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, eds., The Psychology
of Evidence and Trial Procedure (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985) 67 at 81 [Kassin &
Wrightsman, "Confession Evidence"]. Early research indicated that these instructions had
no effect on individual mock juror verdicts: Kassin & Wrightsman, "Coerced
Confessions", supra note 31 at 494. However, an instruction invented by the researchers
stressing both the unfairness and the unreliability of coerced confessions did have an
effect on verdicts when mock juries deliberated. Kassin & Wrightsman, "Confession
Evidence", ibid. at 86-87. Here again, the mock jury research confirms that the impact of
an instruction on jury verdicts depends on the contents of that instruction.
170. See Rogers Elliott, "Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Identification: A
Critique" (1993) 17 Law & Human Behavior 423 at 433-34 (observing that there is no way
to find the "correct" level of belief in eyewitness testimony, and therefore no way to
determine whether exposure to expert testimony helps jurors reach that level).
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overborne by a judge's or expert's negative appraisal of the prosecution's
evidence.171
The essential difference between educating rules and limiting rules is
that the former preserve the jury's freedom to evaluate the evidence.
This freedom is to be valued where the potentially unreliable evidence
also carries some legitimate weight. On the other hand, where the
prosecution's evidence is so unreliable that it seems dangerous to leave
the jury free to act on it, relying on an educating rule with an uncertain
effect would seem unwise. Consider, for example, the self-serving and
essentially unsupported testimony of a highly unsavoury jailhouse
informant admitted at trial in R. v. Dhillon.'72 The Ontario Court of
Appeal overturned Dhillon's conviction partly on the basis that, in
giving a Vetrovec warning, the trial judge had erroneously catalogued for
the jury seven items of evidence capable of confirming the informant's
story, when in fact only one item was at all confirmatory.173 The Court
called the witness "a quintessential jailhouse informant"; he had an
extensive criminal record, largely for crimes of dishonesty, and had tried
to offer information to the authorities in the past. 74 Yet, consistent
with Canadian law, the court never entertained a doubt about the
admissibility of the informant's testimony. One must question whether
a cautionary instruction, however strongly worded, can adequately
protect an accused faced with such flagrantly unreliable evidence.
Dangerously unreliable evidence was also admitted in Hibbert, where
an assault victim and another witness identified the accused as the
perpetrator for the first time in court after seeing him being arrested for
the assault on the television news.175 The trial judge delivered a pointed
171. Jurists sometimes recognize a danger that the judge's position of authority in the
courtroom or the expert's academic credentials might overwhelm the jury. E.g. R. v.
Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 at 21 [Mohan].
172. (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 262 (Ont. C.A.) [Dhillon].
173. Ibid. at 272. The one item that could be seen as weakly confirmatory was the
consistency of the informant's claim that the accused had confessed to looking through
the front window of the victim's home with the verified fact that the victim's home had a
front window. Ibid. at 271.
174. Ibid. at 268.
175. Hibbert, supra note 7.
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and detailed caution on eyewitness testimony, explaining, among other
things, that the in-court identification should be given "little weight."
176
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that this warning
ought to have been even stronger: the trial judge should have
emphasized that Hibbert's news appearance had irreparably tainted the
in-court identification, and should have declared the eyewitness
testimony "highly problematic as direct reliable identification of the
perpetrator of the offence."177 In essence, the suggested instructions
would have told jurors that the in-court identifications were unworthy
of belief and could not be relied upon.178 On the facts, one can
appreciate why the majority thought this extreme form of jury caution
was warranted. However, the suggested instructions could never be
effective, because by admitting evidence, the court invites the jury to
rely on it. No jury instruction and no defence expert can eliminate the
risk of wrongly convicting on the basis of totally unreliable evidence.
There is a natural limit to the effectiveness of educating rules as
safeguards for the innocent.
III. Two Sources of Knowledge
The rules governing eyewitness identification evidence, confessions
and jailhouse informant testimony rest on the premise that jurors' pre-
existing views of the evidence are likely to be misguided. These views,
based on common sense, are implicitly measured against a set of ideas
thought to be more accurate. But where do these privileged ideas
originate? Judges could draw on their own experience and knowledge in
arriving at what they see as a correct understanding of the evidence. Or
they could permit psychological experts to share their educated views. A
basic choice must be made between judges and experts as sources of
knowledge.
176. Quoted in ibid. at para 82.
177. Ibid. at paras. 50-52.
178. As Bastarache J. pointed out in dissent, the majority's suggested instructions seemed
aimed at "effectively remov[ing the identification evidence] from the jury's
consideration." Ibid. at para. 88.
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This part explores the implications of this choice. Some of those
implications - specifically those related to cost, accessibility and
effectiveness - came to light in my earlier analysis of expert testimony
and judicial instructions as alternative means of educating the jury. But
many questions remain about the relationship between judicial
experience and scientific expertise, questions which transcend the
narrow issue of whether to educate the jury through expert testimony
or instructions. Even an exclusionary standard, such as the confessions
rule, must be based on some accepted view of the evidence, a view
informed by knowledge from either experts or judges or from both.
The adversary system requires juries and judges to consider only
those facts that are properly before the court. Ordinarily, such facts are
led in evidence and are subject to cross-examination, and this norm is
followed when an expert witness testifies. In other instances, judges take
judicial notice and accept them as true facts not in evidence."l 9 The
formal rules on the admissibility of expert testimony and the scope of
judicial notice in Canada indicate that it should be relatively easy to
justify admitting expert evidence on eyewitness identification and even
on false confessions, but quite difficult to defend taking judicial notice
of the frailties of unreliable prosecution evidence. Yet where eyewitness
identification evidence, confessions and jailhouse informant testimony
are concerned, the courts exclude expert testimony and rely heavily on
judicial notice. Why does the practice of Canadian courts defy
expectations in this way? More broadly, what is at stake when courts
admit expert evidence or take judicial notice?
A. Experts
In Mohan, the Supreme Court of Canada established a four-part test
for the admissibility of expert evidence.18° The evidence must be
relevant, necessary to assist the trier of fact, presented by a properly
179. See R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para 54 (defining "judicial notice" as
acceptance of a fact without proof").
180. Mohan, supra note 171.
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qualified expert, and not violative of any other exclusionary rule. 81
Normally, the analysis centres on the first two parts of the test:
reliability and necessity. Relevance concerns not only logical relevance
but also a cost-benefit analysis; because experts can confuse or
overwhelm juries with specialized knowledge, their evidence is
admissible only when the judge determines that its benefits outweigh its
costs.182 Although the relevance requirement applies to all expert
evidence, courts are cautious about excluding defence expert evidence on
the basis of this prudential analysis.183 The necessity requirement is met
when the expert provides information that is both "likely to be outside
the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury" and necessary to help
the fact finder reach a proper conclusion on some issue.8 4 While the
credibility of witnesses should be finally decided by the jury and should
not be directly commented upon by an expert, experts may give
evidence on psychological factors relevant to credibility but outside the
jury's knowledge and experience.185
(i) Eyewitness Testimony and False Confessions Experts
It is difficult to imagine an expert witness testifying on the
weaknesses of jailhouse informant testimony because "expertise" in this
area rests with the lawyers and judges who deal with such evidence in
court. But psychologists have probed the phenomena of eyewitness
misidentification and police-induced false confessions, and it is easy to
appreciate how their findings could assist judges and juries. The law on
the admissibility of expert evidence seems capable of embracing
eyewitness expert testimony, and perhaps even expert evidence on the
psychology of false confessions.
The courts have rarely considered whether psychological experts
should be permitted to testify on the nature and causes of false
181. Ibid. at paras. 20-25.
182. Ibid. at para. 21.
183. See e.g. R. v. J.-L.j., 2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 at para. 29 U.-L.J.].
184. Mohan, supra note 171 at 23 (quoting R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24 at para. 42).
185. R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223. See also Mohan, ibid. at 24-25.
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confessions by psychologically normal individuals. As explained above,
the research literature establishes that false confessions do occur, and
that certain interrogation techniques are associated with their
occurrence.186 These simple but counterintuitive insights could be of
great value to a jury tasked with assessing the value of a retracted
confession. 8 7 Yet when the issue has arisen in Canada, the evidence has
been excluded. 88 The psychology of false confessions constitutes a
relatively new field of study that lacks the methodological trappings of
"hard," experimental science. Findings have been based primarily on
researchers' retrospective examination of real police interrogations
known to have resulted in false confessions.189 Since Canadian courts
tend to be wary of expert testimony based on both "novel" and "soft"
sciences,19 it is not surprising that they have not embraced expertise on
false confessions. 191
The admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification
has been more thoroughly analyzed. The leading authority is McIntosh,
in which Finlayson J., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal, offered
four reasons for upholding the trial judge's decision to exclude such
186. See e.g. Trotter, supra note 10 at 198-99.
187. See Hall, supra note 47 at 1341 (finding that a false confessions expert should have
been permitted to testify 'that false confessions exist, that individuals can be coerced into
giving false confessions, and that certain indicia can be identified to show when they are
likely to occur").
188. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
189. See e.g. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 31 (presenting case studies and general discussion of
false confessions arising from police interrogation); United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp.
1198 at 1205 (US Dist. Ct. III 1997): "While [false confessions researchers] utilize
observational, as opposed to experimental, techniques, this is wholly acceptable in the
established field of social psychology").
190. See J-L.J., supra note 183 at para. 35 ("'[N]ovel science' is subject to 'special
scrutiny'"); and Steven Skurka & Elsa Renzella, "Misplaced Trust: The Courts' Reliance
on Behavioural Sciences" (1998) 3 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 269 (describing Canadian courts'
cautious attitude toward 'soft" sciences).
191. See Trotter, supra note 10 at 194 (questioning whether the false confessions science
has matured enough to be the subject of expert evidence). See also supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
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evidence."' First, Finlayson J. questioned the scientific status of the
expert testimony, expressing doubt about whether the study of
eyewitness identification was either a science or a recognized branch of
psychology."' This initial objection is plainly unconvincing in light of
the fact that eyewitness identification had been, even at the time, the
subject of a rich and longstanding body of experimental research. 19 4
Second, Finlayson J. opined that eyewitness expert testimony would
reveal only a simple fact that lay within jurors' ordinary experience:
"that all witnesses have problems in perception and recall with respect
to what occurred during any given circumstance that is brief and
stressful."' 95 This second objection is as unpersuasive as the first;
certainly everyone has had stressful experiences, but this does not mean
that everyone understands eyewitness psychology. If jurors already had
this understanding, lengthy cautions about the frailties of such evidence
would not be needed. Empirical research has long established, and
Canadian law has long accepted, that popular ideas about human
memory and eyewitness reliability are often misguided.'96 Expert
evidence on the subject can hardly be rejected on the basis that jurors
know all they need to know about it.
Justice Finlayson's third reason for rejecting eyewitness expert
evidence rested on a concern for the integrity of the jury system. In his
view, admitting such evidence would call into question the ability of
jurors to decide criminal cases where identity is in issue.' Although
this part of the judgment has been quoted with approval by the
192. Supra note 24.
193. Ibid. at 102-04.
194. See Sophonow Inquiry Report, supra note 4 at 33.
195. McIntosh, supra note 24 at 105.
196. A similar point was made in the false confessions context in Hall, supra note 47 at
1345 ("The [trial] court indicated that it saw no potential usefulness in the evidence,
because it was within the jury's knowledge. This ruling overlooked the utility of valid
social science. Even though the jury may have had beliefs about the subject, the question
is whether those beliefs were correct. Properly conducted social science research often
shows that commonly held beliefs are in error").
197. McIntosh, supra note 24 at 105.
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Supreme Court of Canada, 198 it does not advance a persuasive argument
against eyewitness expert testimony. If juries have systematic difficulties
assessing eyewitness evidence, this is a problem to be addressed in its
own right and not a reason to deny the defence an opportunity to bring
evidence. Moreover, since we already recognize that expert evidence is
sometimes necessary to assist juries, admitting eyewitness expert
testimony represents no radical challenge to the jury system.
Finally, Finlayson J. raised a further objection to eyewitness expert
evidence that is not so easily dismissed. He argued that such expert
evidence was unnecessary because the information that would be given
by the expert could be adequately communicated in the cautionary
instruction to the jury. In other words, Canada's standard eyewitness
instruction renders eyewitness expert evidence superfluous. This
objection merits closer examination.
(ii) The Necessity Problem
Ultimately, recognition that eyewitness expert evidence is not
needed where the judge can caution the jury represents the only sound
justification for excluding such testimony. This necessity justification
reflects the exclusivity principle: expert testimony and jury instructions
are understood as mutually exclusive alternative ways to educate the
jury. The necessity argument also suggests that Canadian courts may
prefer to educate the jury through instructions rather than expert
evidence where possible. Such a preference seems sensible given the low
cost and universal accessibility of jury instructions and the high cost and
limited availability of expert testimony.
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed this preference for
instructions over expert testimony1 99 In D.(D.), the Court ruled
198. J.-L.J., supra note 183 at para. 26.
199. R. v. D.(D.), 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 at para. 67 [D.(D.)] ("A jury
instruction, in preference to expert opinion, where practicable, has advantages. It saves
time and expense. But of greater importance, it is given by an impartial judicial officer,
and any risk of superfluous or prejudicial content is eliminated"). For commentary, see
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inadmissible expert evidence proffered by the prosecution on the
significance of delayed disclosure in a child sexual abuse case. According
to Major J.'s majority opinion, the expert's testimony boiled down to a
simple proposition: "In diagnosing cases of child sexual abuse, the
timing of disclosure, standing alone, signifies nothing.""' In Major J.'s
words, this "simple and irrefutable proposition"0 1 lacked any "technical
quality ... necessitat[ing] expert opinion."0 2 Since cross-examination
would add nothing to the proposition, it should have been
communicated to the jury in the form of an instruction.03 D.(D.)
indicates that experts need not and should not testify to straightforward
facts that form the proper subject of a jury instruction. By the same
token, the case suggests that expert testimony may be needed to advance
propositions that are controversial or technical.
(iii) Adversary Norms
There are two reasons why technical and controversial ideas are
more appropriately advanced by an expert witness than by a trial judge.
First, an expert can bring to bear specialized knowledge in explaining
scientific and technical matters. Second, when an expert is called by a
party in the course of a trial, the expert's claims are subjected to
adversarial testing.' °4 Weak or controversial propositions advanced by a
partisan expert can be exposed and questioned through cross-
examination and argument, or through the testimony of an opposing
expert. Thus, permitting experts to testify about the frailties of
eyewitness identification and confessions would carry all the benefits
and disadvantages of the adversarial process. Such expert testimony
Nicholas Bala, "R. v. D. (D.): The Supreme Court and Filtering of Social Science
Knowledge about Children" (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 283.
200. D.(D.), ibid. at para. 59.
201. Ibid. at para. 66.
202. Ibid. at para. 59.
203. Ibid.
204. See e.g. R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 at para. 42 [Spence]
(explaining that when social science information is presented through an expert witness,
this procedure has the advantage of permitting cross-examination).
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would be expensive, time-consuming and unavailable to many accused
with few resources, and partisan experts might slant their testimony. At
the same time, bringing experts into court would permit their claims to
be tested in the context of a fair process. °5
B. Judges
In the adversary system, the judge enforces procedural rules and
controls the flow of the evidence presented by the parties. Judges depart
from their normal role when they themselves gather and introduce
information. Thus, judicial notice of matters not in evidence is supposed
to be confined to a narrow set of circumstances where this departure
from adversary norms seems innocuous - that is, to facts "so notorious
or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among
reasonable persons," or facts "capable of immediate and accurate
demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable
accuracy."" 6 In other words, judicial notice is limited to facts that
cannot reasonably be questioned. °7 Canadian courts are freer to take
judicial notice of "legislative" or "social" facts which illuminate the
background or purpose of a legal rule than "adjudicative facts" which
relate to the specific events in dispute between the parties. 8 The courts
are also freer to take judicial notice of facts that are peripheral to the
dispositive issue.209 In all cases, however, facts must be in some sense
indisputable or notorious if they are to be the proper subjects of judicial
1 210
notice.
205. See R.J. Delisle, "Annotation to R. v. M. (M.A.)" (1998), 12 C.R. (5th) 207.
206. R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863 at para. 48 [Find].
207. John Sopinka, Sidney N. Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 1056.
208. Spence, supra note 204 at paras. 61-63.
209. Ibid.
210. Eg. ibid. at para. 63 (explaining that "[t~here are levels of notoriety and indisputability").
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(i) Judicial Notice and Unreliable Prosecution Evidence
Evidence rules on eyewitness testimony, false confessions and
jailhouse informant testimony are rooted in judicial notice of the factors
that make these forms of proof unreliable. The standard instruction on
eyewitness identification incorporates numerous propositions about
eyewitness reliability drawn from the psychological literature and the
annals of criminal law.21' None of these propositions is brought into
evidence, and all are put before the jury as matters of judicial notice. 12
Similarly, the unsavoury witness warning normally offered when
jailhouse informants testify relies on judicial notice of why this
testimony is unreliable. In its latest restatement of the voluntariness
rule, the Supreme Court of Canada took judicial notice of the findings
of false confessions researchers, cataloguing the recognized types of false
confessions and identifying some of the interrogation methods known
to have induced them.2 13
None of these matters seems on its face to constitute an appropriate
subject of judicial notice. Cautionary instructions on eyewitness
identification and unsavoury witness testimony warn jurors away from
the common sense tendency to rely too heavily on such evidence. They
aim to teach jurors something they do not already know about what
makes these forms of proof deceptively credible. Equally, driving the
modern Canadian confessions rule is the fear that, if exposed to
involuntary confessions, jurors might discount the real possibility that
they are false. Because the factual propositions informing all of these
rules are generally unknown to jurors, they are hardly notorious and
would seem to be inappropriate subjects for judicial notice. Unfamiliar
211. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
212. See R. v. M.(B.) (1998), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 353 at para. 105 (Ont. C.A.); and David M.
Paciocco, "Coping With Expert Evidence About Human Behaviour" (1999) 25 Queen's
L.J. 305 at 328 [Paciocco, "Expert Evidence"].
213. Gary Trotter, who represented the Attorney General of Ontario as an intervener in
Oickle, has written that the Supreme Court never "formally" took judicial notice of the
false confessions literature in that case. Trotter, supra note 10 at 188-89. Nevertheless, the
information on the psychology of false confessions, drawn as it was from the research
literature, clearly became a subject of judicial notice.
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and counterintuitive propositions of this sort would seem to be more
appropriate subjects for expert evidence. 14
(ii) The Trust Problem
When information is brought into evidence and subject to
adversarial testing, judges need only supervise the adversarial contest.
But when judges introduce information themselves by way of judicial
notice, they bear the entire burden of determining its accuracy.215 Many
commentators question whether judges untrained in social science are
qualified to make such determinations about information on human
psychology.2 16 The Supreme Court of Canada itself has been roundly
criticized for unquestioningly accepting the theory of the "battered
woman syndrome" in R. v. Lavallie.217 Yet, individual trial judges are
given the heavy responsibility of digesting social science information
whenever they are required to craft case-specific warnings on eyewitness
214. Because facts cannot be both notorious and outside the knowledge and experience
of the jury, judicial notice and expert evidence should be strictly mutually exclusive. See
Find, supra note 206 at para. 49 ("Expert evidence is by definition neither notorious nor
capable of immediate and accurate demonstration"); and David M. Paciocco, "Judicial
Notice in Criminal Cases: Potential and Pitfalls" (1997) 40 Crim. L.Q. 35 at 42 [Paciocco,
"Judicial Notice"] ("Ex hypothesi, if it is something you would let an expert testify to, it
cannot be admitted pursuant to the doctrine of judicial notice").
215. See Bala, supra note 199 at 286 (observing that when judges instruct juries on
delayed disclosure in child sexual abuse cases, "it may be impossible for the accused to
refute or even qualify such an instruction").
216. See e.g. Loftus & Doyle, supra note 12 at 341 (doubting that judges can legitimately
take judicial notice of the special frailties of cross-racial identification); Delisle, supra note
205 at 212 (questioning whether judges are scientifically informed enough to take judicial
notice of facts pertaining to the psychology of human behavior); and Leippe, "Eyewitness
Memory", supra note 23 at 949 (arguing that more research is needed to determine
whether expert-substitute eyewitness jury instructions are effective, but expressing
concern that judges may not know enough psychology to produce such instructions).
217. E.g. Delisle, ibid. (critiquing R. v. Lavallie, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852) (suggesting that the
theories about battered women of which the Supreme Court took extensive judicial
notice were flawed and unsupported); R. v. Malott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123 (L'Heureux-Dub,
J., concurring) (adopting in part the criticisms of the Supreme Court's earlier reliance on
battered woman syndrome).
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identification or apply the confessions rule.218 Canadian law places a
high level of trust in judges by requiring them to take judicial notice of
the weaknesses of unreliable prosecution evidence.
(iii) Institutional Competence and Memory
The expansive view of judicial notice undergirding this area of
Canadian law strains against adversary norms. Formally, the law
assumes that judges are no more informed about psychological
phenomena than jurors. Matters outside the experience and knowledge
of the jury are also presumed to lie beyond the ken of the judge, while
notorious or indisputable facts are thought to be well known to both
judges and juries. In reality, however, judges' experience on the bench,
their knowledge of legal proceedings, and their participation in judicial
education programs makes them, on the whole, significantly more
sensitive than jurors to the frailties of unreliable prosecution evidence. 219
Consequently, grounding the rules on eyewitness identification,
confessions and jailhouse informant testimony on judicial notice
acknowledges and builds upon judges' experience and knowledge of
these difficult issues.
Canadian law, at least tacitly, and sometimes explicitly,
acknowledges the gap between judges' and jurors' knowledge of these
evidentiary issues. 220 Judges are recognized as having the institutional
competence to accept as true (and even to instruct juries on) facts about
218. See Bala, supra note 199 at 289 (noting the challenge facing trial judges who must
"filter" social science information and deliver it to juries).
219. For instance, decades of Canadian court decisions have exhibited great sensitivity to
the dangers of eyewitness identification. See e.g. R. v. Smierciak (1946), 87 C.C.C. 175
(Ont. C.A.) (noting that, by showing an eyewitness a photograph of their suspect, the
police radically undermined the value of that eyewitness's identification evidence); and R.
v. Miaponoose (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 419 (C.A.) [Miaponoose] (condemning an unfair and
improper show-up identification procedure).
220. See e.g. R. v. Sheppard (2002), 164 C.C.C. (3d) 141 at para. 46 (Man. Q.B.) (trial
judgment commenting that, in light of the judge's experience and training, an eyewitness
expert "did not provide [the judge] with information that was outside either [her]
experience or knowledge as a trial judge").
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the psychology and reliability of evidence that are well known to the
courts but unfamiliar to the average person.22' David Paciocco has
suggested that courts can legitimately take judicial notice of such
psychological propositions on the basis that they are really only matters
of common sense, but that explanation is awkward, to say the least,
when the courts have acknowledged that ordinary people harbour
misapprehensions about these forms of evidence.222 In truth, Canadian
law recognizes and relies on the reality that judges' insights into
evidentiary issues go well beyond common sense.
Admittedly, individual trial judges may be more or less sensitive to
the reliability issues surrounding eyewitness identification, confessions
and jailhouse informant testimony. Judicial notice of these matters is
taken primarily by appellate courts, which filter knowledge from social
science and forensic experience and disseminate that knowledge,
through appeal cases, to the larger judiciary. For example, cautionary
jury instructions on eyewitness identification and unsavoury witness
testimony have been developed and standardized over many years by
appellate courts. Findings from eyewitness psychology and lessons from
experience with jailhouse informants have thereby been integrated into
Canadian law. 23 Similarly, insights about the causes and features of false
confessions have been received into the law through the Supreme
Court's judgment in Oickle. Of course, trial judges are expected to apply
the voluntariness rule in a way that is sensitive to the danger of false
confessions and to tailor case-specific warnings on eyewitness
identification and unsavoury witnesses. But trial courts are not expected
to reinvent the wheel: they are guided by appellate courts as they
grapple with unreliable prosecution evidence.
221. See e.g. Trotter, supra note 10 at 210 ("By simply reading and assimilating current
legal writing on false confessions and wrongful convictions, the Court has created a gap in
knowledge between the judiciary and juries. . ").
222. See Paciocco, "Judicial Notice", supra note 214, passim; and Paciocco, "Expert
Evidence", supra note 212 at 328.
223. Paciocco, "Judicial Notice", ibid. at 54 (explaining how, through the work of
appellate courts, certain psychological propositions have become 'incorporated into the
fabric of the law").
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This weaving of psychological and experiential insights into
procedural law permits Canadian courts to develop a kind of
institutional memory. If, for example, psychological findings about
eyewitness identification could only be introduced at trial by expert
witnesses, the same findings would be laboriously contested anew in
case after case. The courts' collective knowledge and experience of those
issues would go to waste. Canadian law recognizes and seeks to foster
the incremental development of the courts' institutional competence in
dealing with these evidentiary problems.
IV. Imagining a Spectrum of Safeguards
Having canvassed the strengths and weaknesses of educating and
limiting rules, and the advantages and disadvantages of relying on the
knowledge of experts and judges, it is time to consider how best to
protect the innocent from conviction on the basis of unreliable
prosecution evidence. This concluding part proposes a set of reforms to
Canadian evidence law. These reforms are proposed not as
constitutional requirements based on norms of procedural fairness,
224
but as rational developments of the common law. They represent an
attempt to use educating and limiting strategies and judicial and expert
'knowledge to their fullest advantage, to preserve the appealing
simplicity of the Canadian law on unreliable evidence, and to protect
the innocent without unduly hindering prosecutors.
A. Exclusion
Trial judges should have discretion to exclude highly unreliable items
of prosecution evidence because educating rules cannot adequately
protect against wrongful conviction when the prosecution case rests on
224. While these issues are normally dealt with as matters of reliability per se, it is
occasionally suggested that certain items of unreliable evidence could be excluded on
the basis of procedural fairness under the Charter. See e.g. Miaponoose, supra note 219 at
para. 33 (obiter dictum) (raising the possibility that eyewitness identifications arising
from improperly suggestive police procedures could be excluded under the Charter).
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such an uncertain footing. The confessions rule already operates to
identify and exclude the most unreliable confessions, but in other areas
trial judges are not currently permitted to exclude even the most
dubious evidence on reliability grounds. Reliability concerns, however
grave, go only to the weight of the evidence and not to its
admissibility. 25 Slavish commitment to this principle has resulted in the
admission of eyewitness and jailhouse informant testimony so dubious
and unsupported that it adds no legitimate weight to the prosecution's
case. 
226
For this reason, some have advocated vesting judges with the
authority to make a preliminary judgment on the reliability of jailhouse
informant testimony and to exclude such evidence where appropriate,
227
and others have advanced the idea of excluding highly unreliable
eyewitness evidence. 228 Rather than approaching the problem in this
piecemeal fashion, it is submitted that the courts should adopt a general
rule empowering judges, at the request of the defence, to pass on the
threshold reliability of any particularly dubious item of prosecution
evidence. This power to exclude highly unreliable prosecution evidence
would best be understood as an element of trial judges' existing
discretion to exclude prosecution evidence that is more prejudicial than
probative. 229 Excluding the most unreliable items of prosecution
evidence would cost the system little in terms of valuable information.
The main drawback of permitting an inquiry into the reliability of
225. E.g. Buric, supra note 68.
226. See Part II.B.(ii).b, above, for discussion of Hibbert, supra note 7 and Dhillon,
supra note 172.
227. See Kaufman Commission Report, supra note 4 at 634; and Sherrin, "Jailhouse
Informants Part II", supra note 67 at 179-84.
228. See Roach, supra note 27; and Angela Baxter, "Identification Evidence in Canada:
Problems and a Potential Solution" (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 175.
229. There is already some uncertainty in Canadian law about whether this discretion
can be used to exclude evidence on reliability grounds. See e.g. Buric, supra note 68 (holding
that unreliability does not affect the admissibility of evidence); R. v. Humaid (2006), 81 O.R.
(3d) 456 at para. 57 (C.A.) (holding that, in the context of the judge's discretion to exclude
"[t]here may be cases where the credibility of reliability of the narrator is ... so deficient that
it robs the.., statement of any potential probative value").
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prosecution evidence would be the administrative cost of admissibility
hearings, but that cost could be justified by the importance of
safeguarding the innocent from conviction. Moreover, the cost could be
minimized by reserving the exclusionary remedy for truly exceptional
cases of evidentiary unreliability, such as those where a jailhouse
informant's testimony stands unsupported or an eyewitness's
identification has been irreparably contaminated by suggestion. If courts
were to exclude only the weakest evidence, defence counsel might be
discouraged from litigating the admissibility of evidence that had real
value.
B. Education
Because the proposed standard would exclude only the most
unreliable prosecution evidence, most items of evidence whose
reliability is contested would continue to be admitted, and juries would
continue to bear the responsibility of assessing dubious eyewitness
identifications, testimony from unsavoury witnesses and retracted
confessions. It would therefore seem prudent to try to educate juries
about the known frailties of these forms of evidence. Jurors are already
educated about eyewitness and jailhouse informant testimony through
cautionary instructions, but there is currently no way to educate them
about the phenomenon of police-induced false confessions, and they are
left to assess the truth of retracted confessions on the basis of their
common sense.
Courts should develop a practice of instructing juries on the danger
of false confessions. At the very least, a jury confronted with a retracted
confession should be warned that innocent suspects have been known to
confess to crimes under the pressures of police interrogation - a modest
and indisputable proposition that could in itself help to counteract false
confidence that a confession represents incontrovertible proof of guilt. 2 °
230. See Trotter, supra note 10 at 198-99 ("The fact that people confess to crimes to
which [sic] they did not commit might work well as a cautionary instruction"); Osmar,
supra note 47 at para. 74 (finding it was not an appropriate case for the trial judge to warn
the jury that false confessions have been known to occur, but leaving open the possibility
L. Dufraimont
Depending on the case, it might also be appropriate for the judge to
outline the types of false confessions and the circumstances, including
coercive interrogation techniques, that contribute to the problem.23" '
The judge could explain, for example, that innocent suspects
occasionally confess to escape the immediate stress of interrogation, to
avoid a threatened penalty for remaining silent or gain a promised
reward for confessing, or because police have convinced them to doubt
their own claims of innocence. Further, the judge could caution the jury
that the risk of false confessions is greater when the police interrogate
vulnerable suspects, when they confront suspects with fabricated
evidence that appears to establish guilt, or when the facts disclosed in
the confession do not match the actual facts of the crime. These findings
emerge from the false confessions research and have been judicially
noticed by the Supreme Court.232 Even a brief instruction on these
matters, which are already accepted as true in Canadian law, could go
some distance to alerting jurors to the danger of unreliability and
equipping them to evaluate realistically the weight of confession
evidence.
C. Expertise
Given the ease with which cautionary jury instructions can be added
to the judge's charge at no cost to the accused, Canadian law's
preference for such instructions over expert evidence is justified. If
jurors are to be educated about the frailties of unreliable prosecution
evidence, this should normally be done through judicial instructions.
However, courts should not foreclose the possibility that expert
testimony might occasionally be needed to illuminate some
controversial or technical matter relating to the psychology and
reliability of eyewitness testimony or confessions. Interestingly, some
that such an instruction might be offered in another case); and Lisa Dufraimont,
"Annotation to R. v. Osmar" (2007) 44 C.R. (6th) 278 (discussing this aspect of Osmar).
231. But see Trotter, ibid. at 193, 199 (doubting whether trial judges are equipped to
explain the factors that lead to false confessions).
232. Oickle, supra note 7 at paras. 34-46.
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American jurisdictions permit both expert evidence and jury
instructions on the frailties of eyewitness identification evidence, leaving
it to the trial judge to decide which safeguard to use. 33 This flexible
approach allows for expert witnesses to be called where especially
appropriate, and for jury instructions to be used in other cases.
Canadian courts should adopt a similarly flexible practice with respect
to both eyewitness identification and confessions.
Conclusion
Canadian courts recognize a special problem common to the three
forms of unreliable prosecution evidence discussed in this paper -
eyewitness identification evidence, the testimony of unsavoury
witnesses like jailhouse informants, and confessions. These forms of
evidence raise concerns about wrongful convictions because jurors are
apt to overlook the factors that make them unreliable. Canadian law
takes this risk seriously and aims to alleviate it through evidentiary
regulation. However, the law in this area has hardened into a needlessly
rigid set of category-based rules that are not particularly well-targeted to
protect the innocent. In the final analysis, there is no persuasive reason
why unreliable confessions should always and only be subject to an
exclusionary rule, while dubious eyewitness and jailhouse informant
testimony are always and only the subjects of cautionary jury
instructions.
The analysis in this paper points to a need to loosen the exclusivity
principle that underpins Canadian law in this area. Evidentiary
exclusion, cautionary instructions and expert evidence are all ways to
deal with the unreliability problem, but they need not be treated as
strict alternatives. They have very different strengths and they might
function better as complements to one another. Exclusion is the only
adequate way to deal with extremely unreliable evidence that raises a
grave risk of wrongful conviction. Jury instructions represent the best
way to educate juries, in a wide range of cases, about the potential
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233. See e.g. Hubbard, supra note 123 at 960.
frailties of evidence whose reliability is in question. Expert testimony is
the optimal means of illuminating controversial or technical issues about
the psychology of evidence. By recognizing the special role each of these
regulatory options can play, Canadian courts could develop a rich and
flexible range of safeguards to combat the problem of wrongful
convictions based on unreliable prosecution evidence.
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